



## **Benefits or Burden?**

# **Community Participation in Natural Resource Management in the Greater Kruger Park Area**

Johanna Medvey

Student ID: 2002183

August 2010

MSc Environment and Resource Management  
IVM, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam  
1<sup>st</sup> Supervisor: Dave Huitema  
2<sup>nd</sup> Supervisor: Jetske Bouma  
External Supervisor: Marius Claassen

## Table of Contents

List of Acronyms .....	4
Introduction.....	5
Chapter 1: Background.....	7
The Vhembe District Municipality and the Venda people .....	7
Community Based Natural Resource Management.....	9
Definition, characteristics .....	9
History of CBNRM on the global scale .....	11
CBNRM in South Africa .....	12
Experiences from CBNRM projects in southern Africa .....	13
Turn to TFCAs.....	15
Chapter 2: Research Framework.....	15
Multi-level governance .....	15
Strategies for affecting multilevel governance processes .....	17
The development of ideas .....	19
Build coalitions.....	19
Recognize and exploit windows of opportunity .....	20
Recognize, exploit, create and/or manipulate the multiple venues in modern societies	20
Orchestrate and manage networks .....	21
Conclusions .....	21
Chapter 3: Research Methodology.....	22
Challenges throughout the research.....	23
Chapter 4: Scheme of co-management in the Makuya Nature Reserve.....	24
The history of the reserve .....	24
Management of the reserve .....	26
Important legal issues .....	27
Chapter 4: Case Study Analysis and Discussion.....	28
Idea development .....	29
Ideas emerging from the communities.....	30
Windows of opportunity .....	32
Political windows .....	32
Problem windows .....	33
Coalitions.....	34
Venues.....	36
Makuya Forum .....	37
Tribal Authority .....	38
Strike, started by the community members .....	39

Networks .....	40
The design principles and Makuya .....	41
Conclusion .....	43
References .....	45
Appendix I .....	49
Appendix II .....	50

## List of Acronyms

ARA	Animal Rights Africa
CBNRM	Community-Based Natural Resource Management
CPA	Communal Property Association
GLTP	Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
JMB	Joint Management Board
KNP	Kruger National Park
LEDET	Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism
LTP	Limpopo Tourism and Parks
LWR	Limpopo Wildlife Resorts
P&PP	People and Parks Programme
PPF	Peace Parks Foundation
TBNRM	Trans-Boundary Natural Resource Management
TFCA	Trans-Frontier Conservation Area
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

## Introduction

For a month in 2010, the football World Cup has put South Africa at the center of global attention. The first African country to host an event of this scale, the 'Rainbow Nation' reminded the world of its particular destiny, from a highly divided and segregationist regime to the huge social, cultural and political laboratory it has become today.

Four of the World Cup games took place in Polokwane, the regional capital of the northern province of Limpopo. Before experiencing such sudden fame, Limpopo was mainly known for its natural wealth. Indeed, Limpopo is one of the two provinces home to the world famous Kruger National Park (KNP), and also hosts numerous smaller protected areas. Among them, 280 kilometres north-east of Polokwane and adjacent to the KNP, lies the Makuya Nature Reserve which is the case study of my research.

In terms of nature conservation and natural resource management, South Africa is generally considered as a fairly advanced country, having been among the first to create and manage protected areas on a large scale. Although this positive image is in many ways justified, the reality in Makuya and other protected areas throughout the country is much more complex.

During the apartheid regime, protected areas were mostly designed and managed in total ignorance of the implications for local populations. It is only since the mid-nineties that the country has really been trying to change this, and involve concerned communities in the decision processes and benefits of protected areas. Although this transition is a direct consequence of the end of the apartheid regime, it also reflects a global trend in conservation policies.

For at least the last two decades, various environmental organizations and authorities around the world have been trying to implement new ways of managing protected areas, with a view of maximising their social acceptability, long term sustainability and related local economic benefits. The concept of community based natural resource management (CBNRM) was developed to serve these goals and the new South African regime has generally been a promoter of this trend. This was illustrated in 2003 when the country hosted the 5<sup>th</sup> IUCN World Parks Congress in Durban in the presence of President Nelson Mandela, with the theme 'Benefits beyond Boundaries'.<sup>1</sup>

The Makuya Nature Reserve is concrete example of an area where these new principles are being tested. Having been co-managed by the provincial authorities and the local communities for over a decade, it is a concrete manifestation of the CBNRM concept, and provides a very interesting case study. Additionally, the relatively small scale of the reserve and the limited number of communities living adjacent to it could appear to offer favourable conditions for a successful implementation of new methods and management practices.

However, implementing CBNRM represents a challenge everywhere, particularly in South Africa where protected areas were initially designed with an entirely different approach and where some of the consequences of the apartheid can still be felt. As my research shows, the Makuya case is no exception. Indeed, the reserve's full potential for co-management cannot be reached without addressing a great complexity of historical legacies, legal matters and other political challenges.

---

<sup>1</sup> IUCN website, World Parks Congress,  
[http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/pa/pa\\_event/wcpa\\_wpc](http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/pa/pa_event/wcpa_wpc)

Unless these issues are properly dealt with, the relatively young practice of co-management in Makuya may become a burden for the communities involved.

Therefore, the central question that drives my research is 'To what extent are local communities involved in, and have influence over the decision-making processes of the Makuya Reserve?'. I have also tried to find an answer to 'What strategies do these local communities use to steer the decisions in directions that are beneficial, rather than a burden for them?' and to see how successful they are using those strategies.

Literature on CBNRM provides the background to my research, and the typology of strategies developed by Huitema and Meijerink (2009) serves as my theoretical framework to analyse how various actors attempt to influence decisions in the context of Makuya.

My research is part of the LiveDiverse project, which focuses on the interface between livelihoods and biodiversity. It aims to produce knowledge to improve and assess value-based strategies that promote sustainable livelihoods and the preservation of ecosystems. LiveDiverse is built up of nine work packages and has four case study areas (Costa Rica, India, South Africa and Vietnam). This research constitutes part of Work Package 6 on Socio-Economic Vulnerability.<sup>2</sup>


This paper is divided into five different chapters. Chapter 1 provides background on the case study area, as well as on CBNRM, explaining the concept, how it emerged on the global and South African levels, and the main challenges of implementation mentioned in literature. Chapter 2 presents the five strategies for influencing policy change (Huitema and Meijerink, 2009) which serve as the theoretical framework for the analysis. Chapter 3 explains the methodology used for my research: literature review, document analysis and various types of interviews conducted during field work. Chapter 4 explores the scheme for the co-management of the Makuya Nature Reserve, and finally, Chapter 5 presents my analysis of the reality of its implementation and current practices, based on the five strategies introduced in the theoretical framework. This last chapter is followed by the general conclusion.

---

<sup>2</sup> For more information see the LiveDiverse website at [www.livediverse.eu](http://www.livediverse.eu)

## Chapter 1: Background

### The Vhembe District Municipality and the Venda people<sup>3</sup>




Picture 1 - Limpopo Province ([www.limpopo.gov.za](http://www.limpopo.gov.za))

Makuya Nature Reserve is located at the north-east corner of South Africa, a region with high temperatures and low annual average rainfall, and ten-year drought cycle (Whande, 2007b:8). Administratively, this area constitutes part of the Limpopo Province (see **Hiba! A hivatkozási forrás nem található.**), which has borders with three countries: Botswana to the northwest, Zimbabwe to the north, and Mozambique (through the Kruger National Park) to the east (see **Hiba! A hivatkozási forrás nem található.**). The Kruger National Park is part of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier

Conservation Area (GLTCA) that stretches over to Zimbabwe and Mozambique as well. Because of their proximity, the neighbouring countries and their political situation directly affect the province. This is particularly true with respect to Zimbabwean immigrants who cross to South Africa seeking for services they cannot find in their home country.

The provincial government resides in the capital of Limpopo, Polokwane. The province is divided into five district municipalities, established in the year 2000, among them the Vhembe district municipality, whose offices are located in Thohoyandou. Vhembe covers an area of 21,400 km<sup>2</sup>, has a population of over 1.2 million (2006), and it is further divided into four local municipalities. The district municipality is the third tier of government after the national and provincial levels. According to the municipality's website, about 1.1% of Vhembe's area is urban; and a large part of the land falls under tribal authorities (see Box ).



Picture 2 - Provinces of South Africa ([www.afrilux.co.za](http://www.afrilux.co.za))

<sup>3</sup> The information here is based on data from the Vhembe District Municipality's website (<http://www.vhembe.gov.za/>), and two documents from the website: 'Local Economic Analysis' (<http://www.vhembe.gov.za/docs/Local%20Economic%20analysis.pdf>), 'Investing in Vhembe' (<http://www.vhembe.gov.za/index.php?page=documents>).

### **Tribal Authorities or Traditional Councils**

My interviewees in the field referred to the tribal or the tribal authority when talking about the traditional forms of governance in their communities. Legally, these are known in South Africa as 'traditional councils'. Nevertheless, I will follow my interviewee's example and use the expression 'tribal authority' to refer to what is in legal terms a 'traditional council'.

According to Chapter 2 of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill (Republic of South Africa, 2003) traditional communities must establish a traditional council. These must consist of no more than thirty people, third of which have to be women, and must comprise of members selected by the traditional leader according to customs as well as democratically elected members (at least one fourth of the council).

The functions of traditional councils include several local development-related tasks, supporting and advising municipalities to identify community needs, promoting indigenous knowledge for sustainable development, administering affairs of the traditional community in accordance with custom, assisting traditional leaders, participating in the development of policies concerning the local level, and promoting the ideals of co-operative governance, integrated development planning, sustainable development and service delivery.

#### **Box 1- Tribal Authorities**

The majority of the population in Vhembe district municipality is black (99%) and comprises different cultures. Overall, the population is very young, 75% being 35 years or younger. Unemployment is high in the area, partly because of the legacy of apartheid. Between 1962 and 1994 Venda was a homeland or a Bantustan. From 1973 it was given a government and in 1979 it was granted independence, although, with the exception of South Africa, the international community did not recognize Venda as an independent state. As a consequence of this legal status during apartheid, many people in the region received an inferior type of education, known as "Bantu Education", which is part of the reason why they are now considered 'Previously Disadvantaged People' acknowledging that they did not have equal opportunities in the past.

Similarly to education, the district is the victim of the past with respect to development in general. According to the Local Economic Analysis<sup>4</sup>, further investments in human capacity are necessary with a special focus on education if the economy of the region is to develop to a higher level. Currently approximately 65% of the population lives in poverty and 20% of the labour force has no education. This is a big challenge for development, given the lack of skills and the inflexibility of labour. Only about 1.6% of the labour force has a bachelor's degree and 0.5% a postgraduate degree. In 2006 unemployment rate stood at 49% and was increasing with a decreasing number of people formally employed.

As the above paragraphs about the demography and the economy of Vhembe district municipality demonstrate, there is a great demand for jobs but small supply, and many people lack the necessary skills to be successful candidates. An endeavour like the jointly-managed Makuya Nature Reserve has

---

<sup>4</sup> Vhembe District Municipality's website  
(<http://www.vhembe.gov.za/docs/Local%20Economic%20analysis.pdf>)

(through its tourism facilities for example) the potential to bring benefits to the involved communities, contribute to much needed capacity-building and provide employment for rural inhabitants.

According to 'Investing in Vhembe'<sup>5</sup>, an investment guide to the district, the region has a competitive advantage in the agricultural sector as demonstrated by the sub-tropical fruit, citrus, macadamia nut and avocado exports. But Vhembe's remoteness and underdeveloped infrastructure make it difficult for local products to reach the national market, which is some 550 kilometres away. Together with the prevalence of malaria and the proximity of the military in the Madimbo corridor, these factors hinder the development of the region's tourism potential. However, the Vhembe district is potentially a very attractive tourism destination given that Limpopo alone has over twenty nature reserves, a Natural World Heritage Site and borders the Kruger National Park. Despite some obstacles, tourism remains high on the municipality's agenda, as expressed in the investment guide and in the local economic development strategy (Whande, 2007b).

The Tshikondeni Coal Mine is also located in Vhembe, just outside the borders of the Makuya Nature Reserve. The mine was quoted the largest employment provider of the municipality in 2006.

## **Community Based Natural Resource Management**

The following section provides the background to my research in Makuya Nature Reserve. It describes the concept of CBNRM, its emergence on the global and on the South African level and finally, gives an account of the most frequent shortcomings of CBNRM projects in southern Africa. In my opinion, such contextual and background information is important as Makuya Nature Reserve is a concrete example for the implementation of CBNRM ideas (and more precisely of the concept of co-management). However, as my research demonstrates, the process of implementation faces many difficulties, and sometimes leads to perverse effects, especially under such circumstances as in the Venda region, where democratic and traditional institutions are still learning the ways of co-existence. Before exposing in more detail these challenges, I thought it important to briefly present what CBNRM is and the lessons of implementation in the southern African region.

### **Definition, characteristics**

Various names and definitions exist to describe what exactly is meant by community based natural resource management. Co-Management, Community Based Conservation, Sustainable Development and Use, Grassroots Conservation, Integrated Conservation and Development all refer to more-less the same thing (Chapin, 2004). Most definitions of CBNRM emphasize some form of power devolution to the local communities who then are supposed to manage natural resources and rely on them in a sustainable manner.

One of the most widely used definitions in literature is from Adams and Hulme (2001) who consider CBNRM „*those principles and practices that argue that conservation goals should be pursued by strategies that emphasise the role of local residents in decision making about natural resources.*” (Adams and Hulme, 2001:13 in Whande, 2007a:1)

---

<sup>5</sup> Vhembe District Municipality's website (<http://www.vhembe.gov.za/index.php?page=documents>)

According to Turner (2006), CBNRM refers to *"resource management practices in which people dependent on those resources or affected by management practices are involved in the management and exploitation of these resources."* (Turner, 2006:2)

In the interpretation of Fabricius and Collins (2007) CBNRM *„focuses on the collective management of ecosystems to improve human well-being. It aims to devolve authority for ecosystem management to the local (community) level, thereby empowering communities to manage their own resources without permanently damaging, depleting or degrading them. CBNRM therefore requires strong investments in capacity development and the development of local institutions and governance structures."* (Fabricius and Collins, 2007:84)

As the above definitions demonstrate that there are several perspectives from where the "essence" of CBNRM may be captured. Some definitions focus more on the involvement of local people in decision-making, others are more detailed and emphasize the importance of sustainable development and the role of local institutions as well. For the purposes of this research, I will use the definition of Fabricius and Collins (2007) because it provides the most exhaustive explanation of CBNRM.

What are then, the most important characteristics of a successful CBNRM initiative? Such initiatives usually involve cooperation between the government or other state organs, communities and the private sector. Local communities living adjacent to or in the area of the natural resource have influence over the decisions about the resource and are entitled to benefit from it. CBNRM initiatives also emphasize the importance of sustainable resource use in reaching the dual objective: environmental conservation and socio-economic development.

The definition of Fabricius and Collins (2007) talks about the 'collective management of ecosystems', which is closely in line with Elinor Ostrom's theory on the collective management of common pool resources. Although CBNRM has more of a statist connotation (as the state is actively involved in enabling such projects), and Ostrom's focus is on self-organized resource regimes, the design principles developed by Ostrom (2000) can be useful for the analysis of the implementation of CBNRM. The self-organized resource regimes Ostrom refers to could be seen as the ultimate goals of CBNRM, in which case the design principles can be interpreted as a 'checklist' to determine how far is a certain project from the desired outcome.

Ostrom's theory lists several conditions for a successful, long-term resource regime. First, the rules of the resource regime have to be clear and all participants have to understand who is involved and with whom the members need to cooperate. Second, the regulation of resource use and allocation of benefits have to take local conditions into account. It is important to make user inputs proportional to the benefits to create a fair system. Third, individuals who are affected by the resource regime should be able to participate in the making and modifying of its rules. This helps to ensure that the rules are suited for the local context and considered fair by the participants. Fair rules contribute to the establishment of trust and are more likely to be respected. Ostrom (2000) found that rule violations were more frequent in cases where the rules of a certain resource regime had been established by an elite or a government agency. Fourth, most long surviving resource regimes select their own monitors, who are accountable to the users (or are the users themselves) to keep an eye on resource conditions. Fifth, the use of graduated sanctions through local monitors. In some systems rotating positions ensure that each member of the resource regime is a monitor sometimes,

as well as participant on other occasions. Another solution is when all members contribute resources and hire a monitor jointly. Sixth, access to rapid and low-cost local conflict resolution arenas to resolve disputes between members; and rule violations is necessary. Simple mechanisms and generally known resolutions reduce the number of conflicts and increase trust. Last, but not least, the effectiveness of a resource regime also depends on the recognition of the right to organize by the national or local government. Often, local rules of resource use are formed without the creation of formal, governmental jurisdictions; however, the recognition of external government officials is indispensable as it provides the legitimacy of the rules which makes them enforceable.

### **History of CBNRM on the global scale**

The appearance of CBNRM on the global scene was the result of several factors. For almost a century, conservation efforts were characterized by an exclusive focus on nature and the declaration of human activities as harmful for the environment. This approach, also referred to as 'fortress conservation' resulted in the establishment of protected areas, displacing indigenous peoples and condemning their traditional livelihood supporting strategies (Turner, 2006). However, fortress conservation did not succeed to stop the decrease of wildlife, had very negative impact on rural livelihoods and was criticized for its lack of social justice (Whande, 2007a). CBNRM promised to address these shortcomings by working together with communities living in and around protected areas, involving them in the decision-making processes and ensuring that they benefit from the resources. It was expected to create sustainable, socially just conservation initiatives and reconcile nature protection and development needs (Turner, 2006).

The neo-liberal policy agenda and its focus on the shift of power away from the central state also provided a favourable environment for the emergence of CBNRM. The traditional public sector and the State had become unable to fulfill their tasks and began to delegate some authority to lower levels as well as adopting private sector management practices (Kjaer, 2004). Decentralization and devolution were taking place to increase the legitimacy and democratic accountability of rural institutions (Spierenburg et al., 2007). The Brundtland Commission's report 'Our Common Future' drew attention to the concept of sustainable development and suggested to address environmental issues in a more holistic manner. During the early nineties the notion of 'homo oeconomicus' or profit-maximizing individual also came into question through Elinor Ostrom's work on common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990). Her theory about collective action suggested that public resources can be managed effectively without being privatized or managed by the state, if the group of resource users decided to cooperate and regulate their own use of the common pool resource.

CBNRM was in line with Ostrom's theory about collective action and it was designed to compensate for the inability of the state to control natural resource management in rural areas. It was also encouraged by donors, who started pushing for community involvement as well as for the devolution of power (Chapin, 2004). CBNRM was expected to improve the legitimacy of management decisions by including more stakeholders in the process and taking decisions closer to the ground. Delegation of authority to local levels of government served to achieve better accountability (DeGeorges & Reilly, 2009).

CBNRM soon became the focus of global environmental NGOs. By the mid-1980s World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) has started 'Wildlands and Human Needs' (McShane, 1990), a community based

conservation program (Chapin, 2004). In 1992 indigenous people in protected areas was the major topic at the IV<sup>th</sup> World Congress on National Parks and Protected Areas organized by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Only a few years later, in 1996 IUCN and WWF published their 'Principles and Guidelines on Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas' (IUCN- WCPA, WWF, 1996). Conservation NGOs began to design programs which involved communities and their efforts were further encouraged by funders (Chapin, 2004). International environmental treaties also began to embrace the concept and encourage its implementation. Examples include the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (RAMSAR), IUCN Principles and Guidelines on Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas. These agreements facilitate community based natural resource management practices in wildlife resources and law enforcement, promote the sharing of benefits arising from the use of biological resources, recognize the importance of various ecosystems to the livelihood of local communities and human society in general, and call for policies of protected areas that safeguard the interests of indigenous people and facilitate agreements between them and conservation agencies (Fabricius et al., 2003).

### **CBNRM in South Africa**

The official end of apartheid in 1994 and the transition to democracy provided some very strong incentives for community based resource management in South Africa. The century long practice of injustice in the name of protecting nature called for a new approach in conservation which was supported by a legal background in favour of participatory mechanisms.

The colonial era and the apartheid regime severely disrupted the traditional resource management practices in South Africa (DeGeorges and Reilly, 2009). Centralized, exclusive conservation efforts of the State resulted in land grabbing and denied access to natural resources. Protected areas became sites of conflict between management authorities (i.e. in most cases the State before 1994) and local communities (Whande, 2007b). The negative impacts of protected areas on the livelihoods of rural people and have made them suspicious of nature protection initiatives. Rural communities have become fearful that they might lose their right to land and natural resources (Whande, 2007b).

One of the policy priorities of the new government in 1994 was to address the issue of insecure land tenure and land dispossessions (Whande, 2007b; Turner, 2006). The transition to democracy also required more transparency and accountability in public decisions, therefore the government was eager to democratize rural local government and land administration, as well as to decentralise powers to democratically accountable local institutions (district and local municipalities) (Ntsebeza, 2003; Whande, 2007b).

In the years following the end of apartheid an entirely new legal system was established and many of the new policies emphasised the importance of the participation of informed citizens in natural resource management (Fabricius et al., 2003). In addition, South Africa became the signatory of numerous international environmental agreements which also favour CBNRM approaches. Fabricius et al. (2003) identify almost forty pieces of domestic legislation (acts, laws, white papers, policies, guidelines) which are relevant to and supportive of community based approaches, and over ten international agreements (listed above) to which South Africa is a signatory.

Examples of domestic legislation include the Constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996); the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Policy (GEAR); the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act (Act 57 of 2003), the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (10 of 2004); the Municipal Systems Act (2000) just to name a few. These provide the right of citizens to a healthy and well-conserved environment, to benefits from natural resources for economic and social development, promote community and private sector partnerships as well as sustainable use of protected areas, provide for cooperation agreements for environmental management, enable the participation of local communities in the management of protected areas and call for the participation of communities in Integrated Development Plans that also touch upon environmental management.

As the extensive amount of legislation and several often mentioned cases of land restitution demonstrate (such as that of the Makuleke tribe in 1998 (Steenkamp & Uhr, 2000)), community based natural resource management is politically supported in South Africa.

### **People and Parks Programme**

One of the most concrete South African examples of CBNRM “inspired” national initiatives is the People and Parks Programme. The programme encourages co-management of protected areas, the linking of biodiversity conservation with economic development and poverty alleviation projects and attempts to provide guidelines for the sharing of benefits that derive from the protected areas. The terms of cooperation between different stakeholders are formulated in an official co-management agreement. The programme also requires the establishment of local platforms and meetings with communities on a quarterly basis, in order to know about the issues and ensure that the benefits are handled properly and that the co-management is alive.

### **Experiences from CBNRM projects in southern Africa**

*„If parks and protected areas are to have a chance of surviving in the 21st century, they will have to serve the interest (primarily development/economic) of the rural impoverished majority, as much if not more than the international elite minority, particularly growing trans-national ecotourism. However, land tenure without resource tenure may be of little value to rural people and may dissuade them from maintaining natural systems and associated biodiversity.” (DeGeorges & Reilly, 2009:753)*

Community based natural resource management has been criticized for a number of reasons by a variety of authors. The most common criticisms relate to inefficiency, land tenure, benefit, power devolution and interpretation issues (DeGeorges & Reilly, 2009).

Insecure land tenure can undermine the sustainability of CBNRM projects as local residents do not have a strong incentive to cooperate if the land and its resources do not belong to them. A land tenure related challenge specific to South Africa also poses difficulties for CBNRM initiatives. Prior to 1994 communal land in the homelands belonged de jure to the state, under the administration of chiefs. The state rewarded traditional leaders which collaborated with the apartheid regime and allowed them decide on several matters, including administrative decisions over land and natural resources (DeGeorges et al., 2009; Ntsebeza, 2003; Whande, 2007b). Following apartheid, Communal

Property Associations (CPAs) were established to provide a legal entity which owns and manages the land in the name of the community.

The new South Africa attempted to create democratic and accountable local governance structures, and at the same time recognized the existence of traditional leaders in the Constitution and with the issuing of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill of 2003 (Republic of South Africa, 2003). These steps have resulted in considerable confusion and parallel institutions on the local level. Traditional leaders are not democratically elected, nor are they accountable. Ntsebeza (2003) goes as far as considering this the main challenge to CBNRM initiatives because their “ambivalent existence” either delays establishing laws about land tenure or prevents their implementation. Not surprisingly, democratically elected CPAs and traditional leaders do not always share a vision about land management practices and their clash of interest can also be a serious obstacle for CBNRM projects (Whande, 2007b).

Another potential source of conflict is the issue of benefits deriving from CBNRM initiatives. DeGeorges and Reilly (2009) note that governments and the private sector have become indispensable middlemen between the people and the resources in South Africa and by the time the benefits trickle down the chain of stakeholders very little or nothing is left for the communities. DeGeorges and Reilly (2009) claim that in either case, the revenues are insignificant on the household level so there is little incentive for local people to protect the environment if they also lack ownership of the land and its resources. In the absence of incentives to participate and with reduced or no access to natural resources, it is possible that local people, who were originally intended as the beneficiaries, may begin to consider CBNRM initiatives a burden.

The uneven distribution of benefits can also take place on the local level either if the tangible benefits reach only a few members of the community, or if a group of individuals receives non-tangible benefits (such as training, information or other forms of human capital) that is not available for the others that do not participate (Turner, 2006).

Whande (2007a) draws attention to the fact that complete devolution of power has not taken place. It also calls for questions about the definition of ‘community’ in these projects and to whom exactly does the state devolve its power to? Incomplete devolution of power, authority and rights can hinder local participation. The two types of decentralization, namely deconcentration and devolution, stand for different ways of redistributing power. While deconcentration refers to the allocation of responsibilities to state-related local institutions with the policy-making authority remaining in the hands of the State; devolution includes the transfer of control to the local government which, from that point on is accountable to the local population through elections as opposed to the central level (Kjaer, 2004).

Critiques of CBNRM also emphasise the lack of effective participation. According to Holmes-Watts & Watts (2008), *“there is no significant difference between community participation now and the variants practiced during the 1970s and 1980s where conservationists dictated roles for rural communities that lived at the margins of protected areas.”* (Holmes-Watts & Watts, 2008:440). In their view, community participation is either passive (i.e. community representatives meet with the management authorities but they lack influence) or manipulative. The problem with such practices is that they do not lead to capacity building or deliver the expected benefits to the communities.

### Turn to TFCAs

As the popularity of CBNRM projects began to decrease around the turn of the millennium (Chapin, 2004), the environmental community began to embrace another theme, namely the concept of 'trans-frontier conservation areas' (TFCAs) (Spierenburg et al., 2007). This switch was partly initiated by the donors who were disappointed that CBNRM did not succeed to protect the 'global commons' (DeGeorges et al., 2009) and partly by the NGOs who realized that perhaps they were not prepared to work in the socio-economic realms (Chapin, 2004). As funders grew impatient and relations between conservationists and communities became tenser, international relations in southern Africa were improving. The environment seemed a suitable sector where previously belligerent countries such as South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, could begin their peaceful collaboration. TFCAs were supported on the highest political level in South Africa because they promote regional peace, economic integration and biodiversity conservation through the establishment of wildlife corridors (DeGeorges et al., 2009; Whande, 2007b). Additionally, the branding of TFCAs as PeaceParks mobilizes international financial support.

## Chapter 2: Research Framework

The following section provides the theoretical framework for my research. The core of the framework is a typology of strategies, developed by Huitema and Meijerink (2009). Their typology about the different ways multi-level governance decisions can be influenced is further explained in Bouma and Huitema (2009), which constitutes another important source of the theoretical framework presented here. Any additional sources are specified and their references given throughout the text.

### Multi-level governance

The concept of governance, referring to something broader than government, started to emerge during the 1980s as scholars attempted to make better sense of the situation which resulted from the central government's retreat under the pressure of neo-liberal reformers (Rhodes, 1996 in Bouma and Huitema, 2009). As Kjaer (2004) notes, *"Reference to processes and actors outside the narrow realm of government was now included; yet no common definition of governance seemed to emerge. Governance is used in various fields, such as economics, cultural geography and politics."* (Kjaer, 2004: 3). Some scholars suggested that the turn from government to governance was driven by business to weaken the regulatory powers of the nation state (Swyngedouw, 2005 in Bouma and Huitema, 2009); others saw the financial crisis of the state as the underlying reason (Pierre and Peters, 2000).

The term 'governance' can cover a whole range of institutions and actors (Pierre and Peters, 2000 in Bouma and Huitema 2009). Both government and governance are concerned with the steering of society, however, while government focuses on institutions and actions of the state, governance includes non-state actors, business and civil society as well (Bouma and Huitema, 2009). Definitions of government, to some extent, all *"focus on the role of networks, notice of the plurality of actors and*

organizations involved in the pursuit of common goals, and they are rejecting the sharp distinction between public and private" (Kjaer, 2004: 5). Governance describes patterns that emerge from the governing activities of social, political and administrative actors (Kooiman, 1993 in Bouma and Huitema, 2009). Some might consider governance a synonym of change in the meaning of the government; others see it as a new method by which the society is governed (Rhodes, 1996 in Bouma and Huitema, 2009).

Government still plays an important role in governance, but its form and functions are different in several important aspects. Although there is no complete consensus about what exactly governance is, there is agreement among scholars that it is a significant shift from the past. Certain characteristics of governance are also agreed upon, such as the central government's/state's diminished ability to steer society or the fact that its abilities were restructured. The traditional capacities of governments have been restructured upwards (to regional and international organizations), downwards (to regions and devolved local institutions) and outwards (to international corporations, NGOs and other private or quasi-private bodies) (Figure 1).



Figure 1- Shifts in governance (Huitema, 2005)

There are certain consequences for the practice of governing society. The government is no longer seen as the only entity involved in guarding the public interest and the only entity with the legitimacy to steer society. Thus, the nation state is no longer the central jurisdictional level of decision-making. Although it continues to be an important actor and holds power over other levels, the power of the government has waned. The term governance therefore refers to the way the centre interacts with society and its self-steering networks or in other words, how it coordinates the plurality and complexity of hierarchies, markets and networks (Kjaer, 2004). The classical institutional design (jurisdictions at a limited number of hierarchical government levels without overlaps in tasks) is now seen unfeasible, ineffective, and inefficient (Hajer, 2003 in Bouma and Huitema, 2009). Responsibilities of the state have been shifted, privatized and decentralized to a variety of new organizations. The mixing and mashing of responsibilities create very complicated hierarchical relationships and sometimes even „institutional void" (Hajer, 2003 in Bouma and Huitema, 2009), a situation when it is unclear who is responsible for what and how. Some issues fall „in between the

cracks”, others emerge and draw a large number of organizations which then compete. One could even compare the institutions involved in governance and their interrelations to a plate of spaghetti and the central question of governance then would be ‘Who steers the spaghetti and with what strategies?’.

To increase the complexity of the situation even further, despite the shifts of responsibilities and the restructured power relations, the central government is still the only decision-making body which has the position to determine the official direction of the ‘steering activities’. Thus, changes in policy from the government are still directly influencing governance.

Nevertheless, significant influence comes from other sources as well, such as international organizations which are increasing in importance at the global level and contribute to the greater interconnectedness of the world than before. As a consequence of globalization, not only can problems spread faster and affect more, but the response capacity has expanded as well, scientific practices are integrated, the internet shares stories with an unprecedented speed and global environmental response capacity is emerging.

Networks are important when analyzing response capacity. They are sometimes assumed to be ‘self organizing’ (they emerge spontaneously, flexible on the issues they address, can tailor their interventions to the scale of the problem)(Bouma and Huitema, 2009). Networks can have both positive and negative impacts on steering capacity, depending whether they cooperate with the implementation of certain policies or block it (Kjaer, 2004). Issues of leadership and entrepreneurship are important in the emerging network literature (Rydin and Falleth, 2006; Huitema and Meijerink, 2009; Westley and Antadze, 2009 in Bouma and Huitema, 2009) and this is the reason why the next section is about strategies that communities or their leaders can use to affect multi-level governance.

### **Strategies for affecting multilevel governance processes**

Government policy has become less important in a world of governance. However, as the nation state is still an important actor, its decisions are still very important and to steer governance in a certain direction, policy change is often required. Under ‘normal’ circumstances, policies are quite stable and policy domains tend towards stability because the actors involved in them share a common interest of maintaining the status quo and resisting paradigmatic changes. Bringing about change is therefore difficult because those in power possess the means and resources to remain in power and they formulate rules that reinforce current policy ideas (i.e. there are ideological as well as institutional barriers) (Huitema and Meijerink, 2009).

Policy change can be the result of major performance crises or external shocks or simply changes in the socio-economic conditions, changes in public opinion or in the governing coalition. Agents challenging dominant policy beliefs need to recognize ‘windows of opportunity’, a combination of favourable circumstances to influence the official policy agenda. In some cases, policy change can be based on negotiated agreements/effective negotiation process (Sabatier et al., 2005 in Huitema and Meijerink, 2009).

Understanding how policy changes happen and the role humans and organizations play in these changes leads to further questions like ‘How can this knowledge be applied?’ or ‘What strategies can be used to purposefully alter policy practices?’. Huitema and Meijerink (2009) identify five strategies (namely, idea development, coalition building, finding windows of opportunity, venue shopping and networking) for instigating, realizing and implementing policy change. These strategies can be used by individuals or groups who seek to influence decisions that are taken on different levels. The change can take place from inside the government and be initiated by politicians or bureaucrats, or it can be initiated from outside the government by members of NGOs, academics or individual citizens (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970 in Huitema and Meijerink, 2009).

In order to successfully steer the ‘spaghetti’ of governance in a certain direction, actors need to reach out to the various levels of decision-making. Local actors might need to focus their efforts on other levels than that of their own, i.e. the provincial and the national levels can become important (Bouma and Meijerink, 2009).

The basic idea for the strategies originates in policy science literature on ‘policy entrepreneurs’ which analyzes how individuals and groups can influence public policy. Policy entrepreneurs are found in all sorts of positions and share some important characteristics: they have a good reputation, good networking skills, are willing to spend resources (especially time) in a change process. To be successful, they also need to be good advocates of new policy ideas and good policy brokers.

Not all of the strategies described here are available to every actor and they may not take place in this chronological order. For the sake of simplicity of presentation the strategies are listed as if they were to be applied in sequence. In fact, they are expected to be applied in very different orders and combinations.




Figure 2 - Strategies of transition management (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009)

### **The development of ideas**

The first strategy refers to the development of a vision that can lead subsequent action. There are actors who seek the conservation of an existing situation and there are others who wish to push in a different direction. In the first case the goal is to find defence against disturbances, in the latter the goal is to create a disturbance that will induce change. In both cases, action is guided by certain ideas which come together around certain 'policy frames', 'policy images', 'policy paths', 'long term visions' or 'story lines'.

Numerous policy scientists point out the importance of interests in the formulation of ideas (Majone, 1992 in Bouma and Huitema, 2009). This framework is aware that ideas shape interests and acknowledges that interests can be a motivating factor behind the development of ideas. The link between ideas and interests may vary according to the forum: in scientific discourse there is much less space for interest-based arguments than in politics or in markets.

Usually, more extreme visions of change develop outside high ranking (government) circles, because the actors there are relatively free of bureaucratic constraints and political oversight and are more likely to pursue fundamental change. Within government circles, pilot projects can provide a good opportunity to impact policy process and test the feasibility of new ideas.

Huitema and Meijerink (2009) show for the water sector how ideas like Integrated Water Resources Management, privatization, and greater public involvement, resonate globally in multilevel governance systems. Many ideas originate from developed countries where they are thought out by practitioners or academics. Once these ideas are applied on the smaller scale in developed countries they form one new aspect of government policies. They are subsequently scaled-up to the international level and adopted by international organizations. These high level organizations then tie the idea to subsidy streams and countries which receive those subsidies have to formally adopt the idea as a condition to receive funding. What might complicate the issue even further is that in some cases bureaucracies in the recipient countries resist the implementation of these ideas, or they are hijacked by elites and their particular agenda.

### **Build coalitions**

In almost all circumstances the realization of ideas requires collaboration with other actors which results in the building of coalitions. This is a delicate task as it entails dealing with differences of opinion and power asymmetries among actors. Policy sciences propose different types of coalitions depending on the mechanisms through which they are built, such as ideas, interdependencies or compromises. According to Huitema and Meijerink (2009), there are three potential bases for coalitions. 'Ideational' (shared vision of the world), 'sphere of interests' (interests align), 'interdependencies' (some actors support an idea because they expect something in return, however, all parties involved in the coalition have to realize that they are dependent on each other).

The degree to which collaboration is needed depends on several factors, including the extent of change sought and the institutional arrangements surrounding the decision process. Coalition-building emphasises shared beliefs and explicit agreements on how to use the resources of the actors

to achieve common goals (also similar to this is frame alignment as the key factor for coalition building).

### **Recognize and exploit windows of opportunity**

Ideas and coalitions however, are not enough; those seeking change also need to find the suitable moment to affect governance processes. Windows of opportunity refer to the convergence of circumstances that provide a favourable situation of policy change. A crucial task for those trying to affect the policy decisions is to recognize problem or political windows and work to open and expand them. Problem windows refer to a time when a certain issue starts receiving more attention by the public and the media (in the context of focusing events such as fires, floods, or when monitoring programs expose an undesirable situation. Political windows occur in the context of elections, or other moments with changes in the political leadership, or when political leaders are looking for issues to get involved in. Opening and expanding these windows happens by linking solutions to problems and by efforts to get the resulting policy packages accepted by decision-makers, thus enabling the convergence of the problem, policy and political streams. Solutions are often around before they are connected to a problem. In the multi-level governance setting the number of windows multiplies and actors who aim to influence the decisions need to keep an eye on the developments at several levels.

Most windows of opportunity are unpredictable, but there are some that do occur in relatively predictable frequencies such as changes in political leadership after elections. Anticipation, recognition and exploitation of the unpredictable opportunities are key for those who want to successfully influence governance processes. This can be achieved by preparing ideas and solutions before the windows open. To be successful, policy entrepreneurs need to be good advocates of their ideas. The societal interpretation of crises is often “undetermined” at first, they hang in the balance and advocates of specific solutions need to be proactive in approaching the media to get their message across. Once the definition of a problem becomes accepted, solutions will also be sought in line with them.

### **Recognize, exploit, create and/or manipulate the multiple venues in modern societies**

Nowadays when democratic thought is almost the only system that forms the public discourse on the functioning of government and internet allows networking on a scale previously unseen, the number of venues that can be used for the instigation of policy change has multiplied. Venue shopping describes a strategic behaviour to choose between the various possible places where a policy entrepreneur can affect change. The most suitable venue has to be selected or created and sometimes the group of participants who are involved with an issue need to be altered by changing or modifying the venue. Institutional structures and individual strategies are both important in this process. Actors can try to exploit venues for the representation of arguments that were not meant for that forum, and attempt to change the nature of the venue.

There is a range of strategies available in relation to venues, such as the strategic selection or manipulation of the venue where a discussion takes place,

The multilevel governance setting provides many opportunities for influence, as already demonstrated above where I referred to the the resonation of ideas on different levels. Additionally, international treaties or agreements also offer fora where it is possible to present arguments, including courts that oversee the implementation of those treaties.

### **Orchestrate and manage networks**

Steering policy in an entirely different direction often requires alteration, manipulation, breaking open of policy communities. These communities form a broad set of actors (much broader than a coalition) engaged in a certain policy domain and are referred to as a network. From a state-centrist view, networks are self-organized, spontaneous entities. From a less state-centrist view, they are far from spontaneous and much effort goes into creating and maintaining them.

Policy networks differ in nature. They can be closely knit and well aligned in terms of collective view and actions (these are referred to as policy communities); or more ad hoc and relatively short lived (known as issues networks). Usually, certain problem views are assigned for a certain network as a result of institutionalization. By working within the network and changing the members through discussions, publications, pilot projects or the network itself is altered by bringing in new actors.

Bonding and bridging are two important concepts in relation to networks. ‘Bonding’ depicts the extent to which members of a network are connected to each other and have a sense of community. ‘Bridging’ expresses the extent to which the network reaches to other jurisdictional levels. ‘Nodes’ are members of a network who form the relations with other levels, as a result of their “bridging capital”. Bonding and bridging capital interact in the management of natural resources: bonding is necessary for coordinated action (strong trust is indispensable), and strong bonds are necessary for effective bridging, i.e. representation as one member of the network on behalf of the community. Representation of a network is effective, if there is trust that the duties of the representative are fulfilled based on solid knowledge about the views of the network, as well as the existence of credibility that the members of the network will follow what their representative commits to.

Engagement with others requires investments in contacts. Some networks however, lack resources and thus might miss out in a multilevel government setting as their bridging capacity does not develop.

### **Conclusions**

Changes in policy are related to the emergence of new ideas that challenge the existing paradigm, these can be carried by individuals or groups that need to prepare them for consideration in the public and policy arenas. Those who developed the ideas need to then find or create a window of opportunity that facilitates its public launch. Additionally, policy entrepreneurs need to look for a venue where they air their ideas before various audiences and to undermine the substance, procedures and organizations that work from the ‘old’ paradigm.

The five strategies discussed above can only be distinguished in an analytical sense, in reality they interact with one another and they are strongly interdependent. There are connections between idea development, certain forms of coalition building, and bonding in networks. Effective bridging

activities allow the detection of windows of opportunity, but they do require coalition building through brokerage.

The LiveDiverse case studies, and among them this paper about the communities surrounding the Makuya Nature Reserve, are expected to show how the strategies interact in practice and also the degree to which those seeking change are able to influence multilevel decision processes. The extent to which local communities effectively use the strategies will be indicative of their capacity to handle change (political, economic and ecological) and of their vulnerability to outside pressures deriving from higher scale levels. In this sense, the strategies will serve as tools and help the later work of LiveDiverse in formulating suggestions for improvement in these capabilities (Bouma and Huitema, 2009).

Cultural and institutional characteristics influence the application of these strategies in different contexts. Cultural aspects determine which actors develop into a leading role, and institutional factors are also significant in the sense that the influencing strategies always have to be adjusted to the system (Rydin and Falleth, 2006 in Bouma and Huitema, 2009). Institutional arrangements in management, adjacent policy fields and the government of the country concerned are also in the focus of attention- for instance, in countries with an elitist or corporatist approach to policy-making, the likelihood of radical policy change is much smaller than in countries with open government systems, because the latter offers a better opportunity structure for those who seek change (Huitema and Meijerink, 2009).

### **Chapter 3: Research Methodology**

My report is based on primary and secondary data gathered through interviews in Limpopo Province (see the list of interviewees in Appendix I.) and literature review about community based natural resource management, transfrontier conservation areas as well as the South African legal context. The work of Huitema and Meijerink (2009) provides the theoretical framework. Research for this study took place between April and July 2010 in South Africa, and it included three weeks of field work in Limpopo Province at the end of May, beginning of June.

In order to ensure the comparability of results with other LiveDiverse case study areas, I was provided with a tentative list of interview questions (Appendix II.). These served as a guideline and I slightly modified them for the Makuya context. Some of the interviews were conducted in English (mainly on the provincial level); others were conducted with the help of Peter Mulea, a local interpreter (most interviews in the field).<sup>6</sup>

On the provincial level, I conducted interviews with employees of the Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism (LEDET) and with the employees of the Limpopo Tourism and Parks (LTP). I identified the interviewees from these two organizations partly by researching on the internet and also through phone calls to the provincial government to find out who is involved in the park management. To identify interviewees, I used 'snow-ball sampling', which means that I asked my initial interviewees to recommend other people who could be relevant for this research.

---

<sup>6</sup> All of the interviews were recorded and transcribed in English. They are available from the author on request.

On the local level interviews were conducted in four villages, namely, Mutele B (or Thondoni), Bileni, Duluthulu and Sanari. All of these villages are found very close to the Makuya Nature Reserve and belong to the tribes which have donated the land to establish the reserve. Apart from minor differences in size and population, they are relatively similar to one another, have an underdeveloped infrastructure, they have many houses that are built the traditional way, and a significant portion of their inhabitants live on government grants.

In Mutele B and Bileni the entire LiveDiverse team was present and I participated in three focus group discussions which provided important background information and helped me to understand the context better. I did some household surveys and numerous unstructured individual and group interviews with community members. I used the pre-designed list of open-end questions as guidelines, but at the same time allowed people to tell their own stories if they wanted to. In most cases the interviewees were randomly selected, in a few cases they were specifically targeted either because of their active role in the Makuya Forum or because of their position as village leaders or headmen, as they are referred to in Limpopo.

During the field work I also attended two meetings; one of them was the gathering of the stakeholders from the Limpopo Transboundary Project in the Awelani Ecotourism Lodge, the other one the Makuya Forum's seminar in the Mutele Tribal Authority.

Although the data I collected during this research is not statistically representative, it provides very important insight to the situation and the general attitude of the various stakeholders. I do believe that the opinions of the interviewees and the people involved in the focus groups were representative of the opinion of the larger population living adjacent to the Makuya Nature Reserve. People in these villages were friendly and relatively open. I had the impression that most of them were honest, although, inevitably, there were some differences of perspective (among the interviewees) due to the different roles they played in their communities and their different involvement in the issues of the reserve. I regret not having been able to meet one of the big chiefs, whose name was mentioned by many interviewees both on the provincial and on the field level. It would have been interesting to know about his opinion on the Makuya matters.

The literature review included studies about community based natural resource management, mainly with a focus on the southern African context; recent research conducted in the case study area or in its close proximity (Madimbo corridor, Makuleke Contractual Park, Bennde Mutale village); studies about the role of traditional leadership in post-apartheid South Africa and an overview of the legal framework related to CBNRM in South Africa. The work of Huitema and Meijerink (2009) on policy transition and policy entrepreneurs was also consulted and provides the theoretical framework for this paper.

### **Challenges throughout the research**

I have experienced various challenges during this research, some of which I consider important to mention.

It would have been useful to know more about the case study area before the field work took place, however, only very little information was available. This meant that I gained a full comprehension of

the exact number and location of Makuya villages only during the field work and by then it was impossible to modify the itinerary. As a result, I only visited one of the Makuya villages and three Mutele villages, although there are over twenty of them altogether. Nevertheless, I do believe that the opinion of my interviewees reflects the opinion of the general population in the case study area.

The lack of official documents (Memorandum of Understanding between the province and the villages involved, an official agreement about the co-operation between Makuya and KNP) represented another obstacle in the full comprehension of the situation; however this probably hinders not only this research but the general functioning and cooperation of the involved actors as well.

Some of my interviewees' statements were contradictory. Without available/existent official documents it was difficult to double-check information. This was particularly true about the structure and function of the Makuya Forum.

The language and cultural barriers constituted another challenge, on some occasions the interpreters already had difficulties understanding my questions, so it was difficult to know whether they really asked the interviewees what I intended to. Also, discussing with local people with the help of an interpreter already puts distance between the interviewer and the interviewees, which hindered the establishment of trust in some cases.

Difficulties of transportation and the lack of frequent, reliable public transport meant that our entire group of LiveDiverse researchers had to stick together. The villages in the planning were selected primarily to accommodate the household surveys and it was nearly impossible for me to go to additional places. On certain occasions when it was possible to have an interview or attend a meeting elsewhere, the interviewees did not show up or cancelled at the last moment.

## **Chapter 4: Scheme of co-management in the Makuya Nature Reserve**

### **The history of the reserve**

The Makuya Nature Reserve was established in 1987 after Chief Makuya, Chief Mutele and Chief Mphaphuli "donated" a portion of the land to the Venda government for conservation purposes.<sup>7</sup> In return, the government agreed to pay an annual levy of R1/hectare (approximately 18,000 € in total).<sup>8</sup>

This deal was possible because during apartheid communal land in the homelands, such as Venda at the time, belonged de jure to the state, under the administration of the chiefs. Whande (2007b) points out that in several cases the chiefs in the Bantustans were appointed by the state and consequently, demonstrated certain loyalty to the apartheid regime as opposed to being representatives of their peoples. The collaboration of the chiefs meant security for the regime not only because they would report about security issues, but also because local resistance would be directed at the chiefs first, giving enough time to the national authorities to respond.


---

<sup>7</sup> Interview with Eric Rematsea (Polokwane, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>8</sup> At the time of this research (April-July 2010), 1 Euro was approximately equal to 10 South African Rands

In the absence of official documents about the establishment, I have not been able to recover the precise details of this decision, however, the specific roles the chiefs seemed to have played during apartheid are still reflected in their influence today.

The fence that was between the Makuya Nature Reserve and the Kruger National Park was removed from the very beginning and an electric fence on the “outside” (Western) borders of Makuya was erected to avoid wildlife roaming into the close-by villages.



Picture 3 - Makuya Nature Reserve ([www.maps.google.com](http://www.maps.google.com))

Three tribes, distributed over almost twenty villages live along the 60 km long, 18,000 hectare large Makuya Park<sup>9</sup>. The largest portion of the land, more than two thirds of the donated area, came from Chief Makuya, a much smaller portion from Chief Mutele, and a tiny section from Chief Mphaphuli. Before being a nature reserve, the area was used for grazing, collecting thatching grass and medicinal plants, hunting and fishing (Whande, 2007b). The establishment of the reserve also brought with it strict restrictions on

natural resource use. This, according to previous research conducted in the area, (Whande 2007b) had severe negative effects on the livelihood of local people.

The results of the LiveDiverse household surveys in two of the relevant case study villages show that people were indeed affected by the establishment of the reserve (70% of the interviewees said that the establishment of the reserve did affect them)<sup>10</sup>. Although many of them mentioned the lack of benefits, approximately half of the respondents found the impacts positive (Figure 3). Many interviewees explained their positive answer by mentioning the electric fence, which protects their domestic animals and crops from wildlife, such as lions or elephants that used to pose a threat in the past.

Two assumptions have to be mentioned regarding these answers. First, the reserve was established over twenty years ago and it is possible that not everyone feels as strongly affected today as they might have a decade or fifteen years ago. Second, interviews with community members gave me the impression that opinion formulation might happen on the communal level which would explain why so many people mentioned the protection from wildlife as a positive aspect.

<sup>9</sup> Throughout this paper I will use the word ‘tribe’ to refer to a group of villages which fall under one specific tribal authority. Each tribe consists of one big chief and several smaller chiefs, also known as ‘headmen’. The headmen are the community leaders in the smaller villages and they are “subordinates” of the big chief.

<sup>10</sup> LiveDiverse South African household surveys, 2010




Figure 3 - Nature of impact on households (LiveDiverse South African household surveys, 2010)

### Management of the reserve

Until 1994 the province managed the reserve and the relationship between the provincial government and the communities was limited to the paying and receiving of the annual levy. After 1994 the shift in the entire policy agenda of South Africa and in the accompanying changes of conservation paradigm, the provincial government decided to steer towards more influence to communities in the management of Makuya Park.<sup>11</sup> The reserve operates under the leadership of tourism and a conservation manager. Conservation activities are managed by the Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism (LEDET) in informal collaboration with Kruger National Park; and tourism activities are overseen by Limpopo Wildlife Resorts (LWR), the commercial division of Limpopo Tourism and Parks. All major decisions have to be discussed and agreed upon within the Forum. In case the Forum does not agree with a decision, it has the power to reject it and propose an alternative or to accept an alternative offered by the provincial level.<sup>12</sup>

Encouraged by the national People and Parks Programme to realize this transition of policy in practice, the Makuya Park Forum was established in 1995.<sup>13</sup> The Forum serves as a venue for co-management, and it brings together the representatives of all the stakeholders: the provincial government, Limpopo Tourism and Parks (LTP), the three tribes and SANParks. Each tribe has 10 representatives in the Forum. It is up to the local communities how to appoint the representatives and define their exact terms of reference. The provincial government may have suggestions for this process, but does not interfere with it, unless they repeatedly hear of complaints.

The Forum gathers on a regular basis to discuss issues of management, access and benefits. Occasionally, “guest lecturers” attend the meeting and give presentations about a specific topic. The reason for this is to inform the communities through their representatives about important issues, such as the rationale behind the development of protected areas in general. Such presentations are expected to strengthen the involvement of the community members in co-management, by explaining them in more detail the environmental importance of protected areas.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Eric Rematsea (Polokwane, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Etson Mutele (Mutele B, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

After each meeting the representatives are supposed to return to their respective communities and share the information with their fellow villagers. They are also responsible to notify people about employment opportunities within the reserve. The primary employment policy of the reserve is to hire people from the adjacent villages. When there is a need to hire additional people, the management contacts the Forum, the Forum decides how the quota is shared among the three tribes and then, the representatives promote the positions. Eventually, the Forum presents the best candidates and the management decides.

In order to decide about the annual hunting quota, one of the benefits the communities receive from the reserve, LEDET conducts scientific research and recommends the target to the KNP, which makes the final decision. Each year the communities hire professional hunters (no private individual is allowed to hunt) to take advantage of their quota. The hunting concessions can also be sold to external actors, such as overseas trophy hunters. Hunting, however, is a very sensitive issue, particularly because of the free roaming animals between KNP and Makuya. According to Mr. Malan, manager for planning and development in Limpopo Wildlife Resorts, hunting harms the tourism potential within the reserve, as the sound of the shots disturbs the wildlife.<sup>14</sup>

Apart from the annually decided hunting quota, the communities are eligible for an annual Conservation Levy of R5 per hectare (90,000 € in total). This money is transferred from the provincial government to the tribal authorities who are supposed to invest it for the benefit and development of the communities. Although this levy is taxpayer's money and the provincial government is morally obliged to make sure it is handled in the appropriate manner, the province usually does not get involved in any investigations, to avoid the impression that it mistrusts the tribal authorities.

A third type of benefit deriving from Makuya Nature Reserve is meat. Elephant meat is distributed for free by the management. Other types of meat cost some money. Sharing the meat with the communities is also the responsibility of the tribal authorities.<sup>15</sup>

Besides the People and Parks Programme, currently, another national initiative, the 'Commercialization of Nature Reserves' is also being implemented in Makuya Nature Reserve. This project aims to identify and advance new opportunities, such as the development of new tourism facilities, the management of existing facilities, or the development of tourism activities, like hunting. The intention is to bring private operators on board to grab these opportunities for the benefit of the communities. Many of the communities have signed an agreement with LTP in terms of benefit sharing and their influence how these things would be managed.<sup>16</sup>

## Important legal issues

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (No. 108 of 1996)<sup>17</sup> states that the government is the custodian of the environment for the South African people and it makes sure the environment is kept

---

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Du Toit Malan (Polokwane, 24<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>15</sup> I heard contradicting information about this issue and I am uncertain about the regularity or the exact price of the meat involved. It seems that often not all the villages are aware of the opportunity.

<sup>16</sup> Interview with Eric Rematsea (Polokwane, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>17</sup> Retrieved from the government's website (<http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf>)

intact for the future generations. The provincial governments derive their responsibility from this statement and the People and Parks Programme is the manifestation of state's will to involve local citizens in protected area management, as well as ensure that protected areas contribute to economic development and poverty alleviation (Beaufort West Conference Report, 2006; DEAT, 2004; DEAT, 2006).

On the provincial level, communal nature reserves form one type of nature reserves and in most cases the land in question has been restored to its rightful owners. According to the Constitution of South Africa<sup>18</sup>, if an area had been used for conservation and managed by the province prior to 1994, then, it should be registered as a provincial protected area. In order to do this, however, the land needs to be vested, i.e. restored to its rightful owners. Vesting takes place on the national level by the Ministry of Rural Development and Land Reform, on the request of the province, with the support of the tribal authorities.<sup>19</sup> The lack of declaration can become a problem because as long as an area is not officially protected, environmentally harmful activities, such as mining, can take place. Makuya Nature Reserve has not been legally declared as a protected area yet; the process still needs to be finalized by the minister. This unfinished legal procedure has, however, not prevented the authorities from calling Makuya a nature reserve and dealing with it almost the same way as if it was already declared.

Limpopo Province has twenty-one nature reserves. Most of them have an agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) signed by all stakeholders about the terms of conservation, access and benefits. Up to date, no such agreement has been signed about Makuya, because the communities rejected the terms proposed by the province and wanted to receive more benefits than what was initially suggested.

## **Chapter 4: Case Study Analysis and Discussion**

The following section will provide the analysis of the management and functioning of the Makuya Nature Reserve, based on the five strategies described in the Theoretical framework section above. The main focus of the analysis is on the functioning and implementation of the co-management practices in reality, considering co-management as the manifestation of the CBNRM concept. Because Makuya has been officially co-managed for more than a decade, the emphasis of the analysis will be on the implementation of this concept as opposed to its introduction in the mid-1990s. I will try to answer questions such as 'Who are the different groups and/or individuals involved in the steering of the implementation in a specific direction?' or 'What are the possible directions in which the implementation could take place?' The interviews revealed a complex system of relations, motives and visions about the future of the Makuya Nature Reserve as well as behind-the-scene deals, illegal activities, a strike and tensions between the communities, which inevitably make the process of successful implementation challenging. In fact, the original supporters of the co-management idea can be divided into subgroups which strive for different goals. These subgroups attempt to find the appropriate venues and networks to support the realization of their visions.

---

<sup>18</sup> Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), Schedule 6 about Transitional Arrangements, Section 28(1), p. 45

<sup>19</sup> Interview with Mr Malange (Polokwane, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

The analysis consists of five main points. It begins with the different ideas that influence co-management practices in Makuya, then goes on to the political and problem windows, outlining the windows of opportunity. The third point is about the coalitions that have been formed by the various actors, then, the fourth about the venues which the actors can exploit to present their ideas. Then, the analysis of the strategies closes with a brief section about networks and how they attempt to steer current management practices. The chapter ends with a reflection on Ostrom's (2000) design principles and an evaluation of the extent to which they are fulfilled in Makuya.

## Idea development

Since 1994, Makuya Nature Reserve has been co-managed by the provincial authorities (represented by LEDET and LTP) and the "donor" communities living adjacent to the area. The idea of co-management came from the province, in accordance with the new political expectations officially declared in the 1996 Constitution of South Africa, and with the approaches of the international conservation community<sup>20</sup>, which I have described in the background section at the beginning of this paper. According to Thomas Mudzuri, one of the previous managers of Makuya, the co-management was proposed by the provincial government for the benefit of the communities whose land constitutes the reserve.<sup>21</sup>

There are two concrete national level plans which influence co-management practices in Makuya and are the consequences of changes on the international and national political scene. One of them, launched in 2003 is known as the People and Parks Programme, currently being implemented by the provincial government. Another, more recent idea from the national level with considerable outcomes for the Makuya communities is the National Protected Area Expansion Strategy (Government of South Africa, 2010)<sup>22</sup>. This is currently taking place in the form of the Limpopo Transboundary Project, incorporating several protected areas.

The idea of CBNRM and the shape it was proposed in Makuya Nature Reserve were not contested by local communities. The ideas developed by local actors (e.g. representatives in the Makuya Forum) seem to mainly concern the way the co-management is implemented, rather than the concept of CBNRM itself. They have suggested the re-introduction of hunting in the reserve and have lobbied for exclusive management, without the involvement of the provincial government.<sup>23</sup> Recently, the Mutele tribe has been considering leaving the existing structure and establishing its own section of Makuya. Although this is a less realistic idea than some others, it has the potential to influence discussions about the reserve's management.

The following paragraphs will elaborate on these issues in more detail.

---

<sup>20</sup> Interview with Eric Rematsea (Polokwane, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>21</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>22</sup> Information from the website of the South African Government Department of Environmental Affairs, <http://www.environment.gov.za>

<sup>23</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

### **Ideas emerging from the communities**

The Makuya Nature Reserve functions through the co-operation of the management (consisting of the conservation and the tourism managers from the Limpopo Province) and the Makuya Forum (consisting of community representatives, the reserve manager, a representative of KNP and some people from the tribal authorities). Ordinary community members who are neither representatives, nor part of the tribal authority depend on the information delivered to them by their representatives. Since this is often not the case, many people in these villages are not even aware of the existence of the Makuya Forum. Others do not seem to be aware that their village belongs to the “Makuya communities”, i.e. it should be benefiting from the reserve.<sup>24</sup> Finally, there are people, who do know that they are one of the Makuya communities, know about the Forum, maybe even have a notion about who their representative is, but are completely disillusioned due to the lack of information and tangible benefits.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, I believe the likelihood of a large proportion of people in these communities presenting their ideas for policy change is quite low, if realistic at all. Nevertheless, some ideas do derive from the local level and are present in the discussions of the Forum and the management. These ideas can either be also formulated on the communal level and expressed by the representatives, or, they only reflect the opinion of a few, influential community members who have access to higher levels through their positions in the Forum or in the tribal authority.

### ***The re-introduction of hunting in the reserve***

Although I have contradictory information about the issue of hunting, it seems that between 1996 and 2008 no official hunting was taking place in Makuya Nature Reserve. According to Thomas Mudzuri, after the communities came up with the idea and suggested it in the Forum, the management refused. The communities kept on lobbying for it and reasoned that this would increase their benefits. They even reached out to the provincial level and eventually succeeded.

Usually, the communities arrange a professional hunter who advertises the concessions among the hunting community. The concessions are sold predominantly to people from overseas. During the hunt itself several local people have the opportunity to be trained for skinning animals, for cooking, etc. In theory, the revenues from the hunt are divided between the three tribes, but, according to the acting headman of Duluthulu, a Mutele village, this is not the case. Several people mentioned that mostly people from overseas hunt in Makuya and the money paid by people from overseas goes to the tribal authorities and stays with them.<sup>26</sup>

Hunting is a hotly debated issue partly because it is almost the only activity that brings income, and partly because the fate of this income is not always clear. As the above remarks demonstrate, the introduction of hunting has clearly benefited some stakeholders, however, those benefits have not reached the majority of the community members.

### ***Changing the proportion of benefits the communities receive***

Other issues emerging from the local level relate to the benefits. Since the establishment of the reserve, benefits have been distributed to the tribes proportionally to the size of the land they had

---

<sup>24</sup> Interview with Bileni community member (Bileni, 25<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>25</sup> Interview with Mutele B community member (Mutele B, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>26</sup> Interview with acting headman of Duluthulu (Duluthulu, 31<sup>st</sup> May 2010)

donated. This means that the Makuya tribe is eligible for about 80% of the revenues, the Mutele tribe for around 15% and the Mphaphuli for approximately 5%. The power relations among the three tribes reflect a similar proportions.

Etson Mutele, representative of the Mutele B village in the Forum has explained about ongoing discussions aiming to change the figures of distribution. The Mutele tribe is determined to increase the Mutele and the Mphaphuli shares of benefits to 25% each and leave 50% of the revenues to Makuya. The negotiation process has not been concluded yet and Mutele's position is not made easier in the current absence of a tribal chief. Unfortunately, I have not been able to talk with a Forum representative of the Makuya tribe, thus, I have no information about their reaction to this proposal.

### ***Managing the reserve without provincial involvement***

A third idea currently attendant from the local level is that of managing the reserve independently. Lately, the communities have been increasingly motivated to take over all the management tasks and continue without the involvement of the provincial authorities. People in LEDET and in LTP are well aware of these aspirations but convinced that the communities lack the capacity to turn them into reality.

Manager for planning and development in Limpopo Wildlife Resorts, Mr. Malan has expressed that the communities do have quite an influence:

*"I think that they [the communities] have quite a considerable say. It is the community that decided not to enter into this agreement [about the co-management with the province] although it's not the policy environment. The policy environment says that because of the value of these assets and the lack of capacity in these communities, there should be a partnership between the community and the provincial government. That's the policy environment."<sup>27</sup>*

Mr. Mudzuri, one of the previous managers of Makuya, has also made it clear that the communities have exercised their power by rejecting not only the co-management agreement, but the idea of LTP being responsible of the tourism activities:

*"A co-management agreement was written and the communities rejected it. They said that they want to have their own developers, not LTP. LTP was the one supposed to control all the developers, all the people coming to do tourism related issues. But they refused and now it seems as if they got powers to look for their own developers to come and develop the area. If they want maybe a new concession. They can do that by themselves."<sup>28</sup>*

Additionally, the growing importance of the transfrontier idea puts Makuya into a new perspective for some key stakeholders, including Mr. Malan. The transfrontier discussions shape the possibilities of the communities in terms of managing the reserve independently.

*"We are very uncomfortable with a situation where a rural community is taking decisions on what is actually not only national, but international asset. Because Makuya is part of the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Park."<sup>29</sup>*

---

<sup>27</sup> Interview with Mr. Malan (Polokwane, 24<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>28</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>29</sup> Interview with Mr. Malan (Polokwane, 24<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

### **Mutele tribe considering leaving**

Yet another idea originates from the Mutele tribe. Unhappy with the distribution of benefits and Chief Makuya's influence over the decision-making, the Mutele tribe has been considering leaving the existing arrangement.<sup>30</sup> As already mentioned before, the Mutele donated approximately 15% of the land and lies in between the Makuya (to the north) and the Mphaphuli (to the south) tribes. According to Calvin, Forum representative of Duluthulu, Mutele B village, the reason for their consideration was the Mutele tribe's disapproval of Chief Makuya's attempts to make decisions on his own.

Given the location of the Mutele land however, it seems unlikely that such plan would materialize. On the other hand, such a plan could be successfully presented to the other two tribes as a potential threat and perhaps be used to convince them of a revised deal about benefit sharing or about the structure of the Makuya Forum.

### **Windows of opportunity**

The most important and most obvious political window of opportunity has been the end of apartheid, which brought about the legislative changes and the need for more participatory conservation projects. The background provided at the beginning of this paper described in detail how the concept of community based natural resource management emerged and was consolidated on the South African political scene with the introduction of supportive laws and national initiatives.

There are other windows of opportunity, however, which might be smaller in scale but important for the Makuya stakeholders, such as political changes in the provincial government or in the tribal authorities. Other examples include increased media attention on poaching and hunting.

### **Political windows**

Some of the political windows provide predictable opportunities for change. An example for this was the change of Member of the Executive Council (MEC)<sup>31</sup> for LEDET at the beginning of 2010. The previous MEC was known for having connections to Chief Makuya and stepping into agreement with him concerning Makuya hunting concessions, without the involvement of the Forum. The new MEC, according to Thomas Mudzuri, has announced his determination to achieve more transparency. As a result, the annual hunting quotas were not issued in 2010; instead the "unused" quotas from the previous year have to be finished.<sup>32</sup>

The death of Chief Mutele in late 2009 has also brought about a political window of opportunity for several reasons. It has allowed Chief Makuya and Chief Mphaphuli to engage in discussions without a representative from the Mutele tribe.<sup>33</sup> This might contribute to the general lack of trust and cooperative spirit in the long term, which would have negative impacts on the functioning of the reserve. The other reason why the death of Chief Mutele constitutes a political window is because it

---

<sup>30</sup> Interview with Calvin (Duluthulu, 1<sup>st</sup> June, 2010)

<sup>31</sup> MECs are appointed by the provincial premier of each South African province to serve on the executive council (~the cabinet at the provincial level) ([www.southafrica.info](http://www.southafrica.info))

<sup>32</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>33</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

will enable a new stakeholder to enter the discussions. This new person (still to be decided upon by the Mutele kraal) might bring new ideas to the debate about the park management. Simultaneously, the decease of a key actor also marks the end of a political window. His successor could take up the issues Chief Mutele stood for, however, without the same personal connections and relations, the successor will not be able to cooperate with the same coalitions or reach the same networks.

### Problem windows

Currently two issues have distinct importance within the Makuya discussions, the issue of poaching and the issue of hunting. Officials at the provincial level as well as local members of the Makuya Forum are aware of the problem of poaching. According to Eton Mutele, Forum representative of Mutele B, part of the reason for poaching in the area is cultural; the other part is the lack of food.<sup>34</sup> People struggle to provide for their families and as a last resort they decide to poach in Makuya Nature Reserve, although it is a dangerous endeavour. The risks have increased since last year, when five police stations of the area entered into collaboration to curb poaching. If someone is caught poaching, he can be arrested and taken to prison.

There is also an increasing consciousness about poaching in the media (local and international as well)<sup>35</sup>. The focus of this is on rhinos, which are the primary targets of poachers on the demand of Vietnamese, Chinese and Middle East customers (Conway-Smith, 2010). In July 2010, several articles were published in the media about the alarming number of rhinos poached in South Africa since the beginning of the year. In Kruger National Park alone, sixty-five white rhinos and one black rhino has been killed for their horns. According to Dr. David Mabunda, chief executive of SANParks, the illegal killing of rhinos at this unprecedented high-level is part of organized crime (Strauss, 2010). SANParks has urged the public to alert the authorities of any suspicious activities and revealed that up to date 47 suspects and high level dealers have been arrested in the country (Hamlyn, 2010). The latest person sentenced to jail for ten years for trying to smuggle horns out of South Africa was a Vietnamese citizen (Duval Smith, 2010).

The increased media attention might lead to stricter regulations on poaching within Makuya Nature Reserve as well. This process has already started last year, when the police stations agreed to join their forces against illegal hunting in the park. Although there is a difference between the reasons and the targets of the poachers in Makuya and those killing rhinos, the issue of the latter may deteriorate the chances of the former to get away with a fine or a short period in prison.

The issue of hunting in Makuya has also been frequently discussed since the co-management came into force over fifteen years ago. The communities had been pushing for hunting concessions and have succeeded, however, hunting remains up to day a controversial topic. There are two main reasons for this. From the communities' perspective, the (undistributed or unfairly distributed) benefits from hunting grieve many people.

---

<sup>34</sup> Mr. Mutele (Mutele B, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>35</sup> Examples include the Kruger Park Times Online ([www.krugerparktimesonline.com](http://www.krugerparktimesonline.com)), News24 ([www.news24.com](http://www.news24.com)), The Observer (<http://observer.guardian.co.uk>), GlobalPost ([www.globalpost.com](http://www.globalpost.com))

From the NGO perspective, the possibility to hunt Kruger game in adjacent provincial and private parks is what provides reason for criticism. A recently published report<sup>36</sup> of Animal Rights Africa (ARA) criticised the hunting policies of South Africa and called for widespread public debate and thorough examination of the issue. It also called for government conservation agencies to publicize their hunting statistics on their websites. One part of the report focused on SANParks and condemned the organization for allowing Kruger animals to be hunted in adjacent provincial and private parks, such as Makuya. Since many of these parks share unfenced borders with KNP and allow hunting, it is inevitable that some of the trophies from those areas are Kruger game. According to the report, SANParks refuses to admit that this is taking place, even though it meets the managers of these parks on a regular basis and is involved with the decisions about the hunting quotas.

Several hunting reports on the internet also contradict the SANParks denial and tell stories about game from KNP. Limpopo Travel, a Danish hunting company which has concession in the Makuya Nature Reserve is one of them. According to their online catalogue, “in our new great big game area, Makuya, a lot of our clients bagged impressive buffalos and elephants.”<sup>37</sup> They also emphasise that game can cross freely the Levuvhu River and be in Makuya. The catalogue also explains about elephant projects taking place in the KNP, involving fitting a collar on a number of elephants. Limpopo Travel warns that these elephants have to be spared, according to an agreement with SANParks. According to the ARA report however, SAN Park denies having an agreement with the company and says it is the Limpopo provincial authorities which are in agreement with Limpopo Travel.<sup>38</sup>

ARA openly questions whether SANParks is fulfilling its mandate to enhance biodiversity through the protection of animals and plants if it allows the issuing of hunting concessions in those parks. While SANParks rejects the criticisms that animals from KNP are killed by hunters in private reserves (ARA, 2010: 21), the government claims that hunting in South Africa takes place according to the concept of sustainable use of natural resources.

## Coalitions

Several coalitions can be identified in the context of the Makuya Nature Reserve. Some of them are based on common interests and pursue goals supported by the national and provincial levels; others are based on shared ideas and strive for common (material) benefit. Some involve stakeholders from different levels (i.e. from the local and the provincial level), others are formed among actors in parallel positions.

There is a formal link between Shonisani Mphaphuli, senior manager of Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism and Phineas Nobela, manager senior manager of conservation management in Kruger National Park. Nobela, also responsible for the relations with adjacent parks at the northern section of KNP, has been involved in the drawing up of an agreement

---

<sup>36</sup> ‘Hunting in South Africa- A bloody mess’. Available from ARA’s website at <http://www.animalrightsafrica.org>

<sup>37</sup> Quoted from page 6 from ‘A world of HUNTING adventures’. Available through the website of Limpopo Travel at <http://ipaper.ipapercms.dk/LimpopoTravel/UK/Katalog2010/>

<sup>38</sup> I approached this company in email to find out more about their development work in the Makuya communities (which they mention in detail in their brochure), but when I received their reply (two months later) they told me they were unable to assist me in my research.

between Makuya and KNP about their co-operation. Although the two have shared a fence-less border for over two decades, still no official agreement exists about their relationship. Terms of this co-existence are being formalized at the moment. It was these issues that initially brought Ms. Mphaphuli and Mr. Nobela together. However, through the plans for the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (in which they are both involved) the link between LEDET and KNP via these two individuals is further strengthened based on their shared objectives. Together, they promote the TFCA idea on the basis of the National Protected Area Expansion Strategy (Government of South Africa, 2010)<sup>39</sup>. The goal of the expansion is to achieve ecological sustainability and adaptation to climate change. The strategy expresses that TFCAs provide opportunities to scale up the contributions of protected areas (i.e. biodiversity conservation and ecological sustainability, adaptation to climate change, land reform and rural livelihoods, socio-economic development) and “to strengthen links between ecological sustainability benefits and socio-economic benefits.” (Government of South Africa, 2010: 9)

Within Limpopo Province, the expansion of protected areas is planned to take place partly through the realization of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park. This would include the northern part of Kruger National Park, known as the Pafuri triangle, Makuya Park, and maybe expand towards the Madimbo corridor in the long term in order to join these areas. Ms. Mphaphuli referred to these plans as one of the key action points of her department.

*“Because we are responsible for expansion we had several meetings with the KNP, and because Makuleke is part of the Joint Management Board so it was even discussed there that it/we would like to remove all this area here. So what I did was that I contacted Phineas Nobela in Kruger National Park because he is dealing with expansion also of KNP from that side. So we were talking about this issue because his achievements are also my achievement. Having a nature reserve, a provincial nature reserve that is adjacent to the Kruger National Park so we thought it would be maybe a wise move to remove the fences in between for the sake of the animals to roam free.”<sup>40</sup>*

An example for a different type, interest-based coalition would be the relationship between Chief Makuya and the previous Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism. Although it was not possible for me to meet these people, many others (who were concerned about this relationship) have drawn my attention to it.<sup>41</sup> Supposedly, the Chief Makuya and the MEC for LEDET have concluded an agreement concerning the hunting concessions, without consulting the Forum or the park management. Following the sealing of this deal, professional hunters arrived to Makuya Nature Reserve and were in possession of the necessary permits. The management, which had not been previously informed, was greatly surprised.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup> Information from the website of the South African Government Department of Environmental Affairs, <http://www.environment.gov.za>

<sup>40</sup> Interview with Ms. Mphaphuli (Polokwane, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2010)- she refers to the fence between the Makuleke Contractual Park and the Makuya Nature Reserve

<sup>41</sup> Interview with Mr. Malan (Polokwane, 24<sup>th</sup> May 2010) and with Mr. Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>42</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

One of the people involved with Makuya issues on the provincial level has explained his concerns in more detail.<sup>43</sup> According to him, the secret deal of last year was in fact a serious bribery which resulted in the transfer of five million Rands from a private company to Chief Makuya and one of the key decision-makers from the province. At the time of this research, there was no official evidence about this nor was an investigation taking place to discover further details of the deal. Given the poverty in the area, people may have difficulty rejecting such large sums of money which are immediately available, in favour of the long term revenue potential, which is uncertain. It is important to note however, that coalitions which are based solely on the shared interest in financial benefits could harm the trust of provincial authorities as well as of communities and undermine co-management scheme.

Although no 'opposing coalition' came to my attention, many interviewees expressed their disapproval of Chief Makuya's influence. The influence of him and adviser Prinze's is recognized by the other tribes and the Forum representatives, and they do benefit from this occasionally, however, their reputation about money issues is rather negative. Thus, it seems reasonable to wonder, why is there no organized opposition? Perhaps the cultural taboos prevent people to openly confront the tribal authorities or the chief. Perhaps the general mistrust in others contributes to the lack of coalitions. Another reason may be the lack of awareness (or existence?) of established conflict-resolution mechanisms within the framework of local institutions.

*"Not trust. We can't say trust, because on the benefit side, on the money side, they think that he is not trustworthy. We can't say they trust him. But they can choose them to represent them. If they want something new, those people, that Prinze and Chief Makuya can lead them and they can win what they want to."<sup>44</sup>*

In an informal discussion with four of the park's female employees Chief Makuya and Prinze were also referred to as the ones who "eat their money". When asked what they would propose to happen they suggested the arrest of the thieves.<sup>45</sup>

Despite the lack of a distinct opposing coalition, the unhappiness and the impression of people that they are being treated in an unfair manner did lead to some action, such as the strike in Ha-Makuya village last year.

## Venues

Once the actors have developed ideas and formed coalitions to promote their ideas, they need a place where changes can be affected from. Which venues are then available for the Makuya stakeholders? The most obvious one is the Makuya Forum, which, in theory, is actively involved in all major decisions. However, there are other venues that provide opportunity for less official opinion formulation and influence.

---

<sup>43</sup> Anonymous interviewee

<sup>44</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>45</sup> Interview with four employees (Makuya Nature Reserve, 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2010)

## Makuya Forum

As already discussed in a previous section of this paper (Introduction to the case study area), the Makuya Park Forum exists since 1995 and serves as a venue for co-management. It brings together local representatives, the provincial government, the representatives of the three tribal authorities and SANParks.

Ideally, representatives (10 from each tribe) should function as the link between those directly involved with the issues of the reserves and those affected by it. Their role is to provide information to their fellow villagers about the ongoing discussions and represent their opinion at the Forum meetings. For example, notification about employment possibilities or the possibility to buy meat from the reserve at a good price (only at the disposal of these villages) are also the responsibilities of the representatives.

Interviewees who knew about the existence of the Forum in Mutele B and Sanari were not aware of the process through which representatives were appointed or about the length of their appointment. Interviewees in Bileni, a tiny Mutele village, were not even aware of the fact that they were involved in the issues of the Makuya Nature Reserve, let alone knowing about their representatives (one of which happened to be the acting headman, according to whom everything was functioning as it was supposed to).<sup>46</sup>

*“When I was in Makuya, it was very much difficult to see the benefit of the communities. And we tried to do anything, we ended up doing tourism and conservation awareness to the communities. When we go there people are always asking us “what benefits are we getting?” then we try to tell them about the protocol. Ourselves, when we do things we do them through the Forum. The Forum must come and tell you what. If it’s money or any benefit you have to do it like that way. But they end up not knowing what we have agreed. They just said ‘we don’t know what you are doing at the reserve. We think that you are just working at the government without us.’ No, we are definitely not one of those things. There are more questions than answers when we go out to the community because of these benefits. We can talk about it at the Forum, but when those people go back, it doesn’t reach the real people. That will be a problem forever if it won’t be solved.”<sup>47</sup>*

So, if the community members cannot utilize the Forum as a venue due to the lack of awareness, who can?

Chief Makuya is known for having an adviser, Prinze, whose deftness in conservation and tourism issues is recognized even by the provincial authorities.<sup>48</sup> The chief and his confidant form a very influential team and are able to manipulate the Forum<sup>49</sup>, especially because most of the other local representatives have less knowledge about the matters at stake. This influence is appreciated by the others on certain occasions (for example when bargaining with LEDET for hunting concessions) and condemned on others (when the chief allegedly makes secret deals with the province and refuses to share the benefits).

---

<sup>46</sup> Interview with acting headman of Bileni (Bileni, 25<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>47</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>48</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>49</sup> I have contradictory information about the involvement of Chief Makuya in the Forum. Some people told me that the chiefs were also in the Forum, others said the opposite. Even if the chief himself is not a member of the Forum, another one of his kraal, Mr. Lalumbe, the Forum’s chairman is able to convey the chief’s influence.

The provincial government also attempts to influence the Forum and disseminate information through the representatives. During my fieldtrip I attended a Forum meeting<sup>50</sup> held at the Mutele Tribal Authority. At this meeting, the Forum welcomed a university professor and two students from the University of Venda, who had detailed presentations about the importance of protected areas in general. The purpose of this delegation was to improve rural people’s understanding of the importance of environment conservation. This understanding is expected to encourage their participation and potentially decrease poaching as a consequence.

### Tribal Authority

There are three tribal authorities who are involved in the Makuya issues, however I have only met members of the Mutele Tribal Authority. Usually, members of the “tribal”, as local people refer to it, are also part of the each tribe’s “royalty” or “kraal”. The kraal is a distinct group of people, basically the top management of a group of villages. The Mutele Tribal Authority overlooks five villages, the Makuya Tribal Authority over double that amount.

Theoretically, the Tribal Authority should provide a suitable venue to discuss issues of the nature reserve and formulate or present new ideas. The tribal’s role, according to national legislation (Republic of South Africa: Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill of 2003) includes the promotion of ideals of co-operative governance, integrated development planning and sustainable development. Based on this, it would be a logical choice to utilize this venue, however, most people do not consider the traditional authorities trustworthy and refrain from bringing their ideas to this venue (see Figure 4)<sup>51</sup>.




Figure 4 - Trust in Tribal Authorities (LiveDiverse South African household surveys, 2010)

*“Let me say you go to Mutele and you say tell us what did you do with the benefit you get from hunting. No one will show you. No one. Even in Makuya where they get a large portion of money they will never show you anything. Nothing will be shown out of that hunting which happens there.”<sup>52</sup>*

<sup>50</sup> Makuya Forum meeting (Mutele B, 5<sup>th</sup> June 2010)

<sup>51</sup> LiveDiverse researchers in charge of the South African household surveys have specified that respondents referred to traditional authorities and/or the chief when answering this question.

<sup>52</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwande Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

*“But this way of money being taken to the tribal council, it will never work. They will never get anything. Because when money comes there, they use it as they wish. And they say that the government, the provincial and the national is the one that must develop that community.”<sup>53</sup>*

Multiple sources have confirmed that the revenues from the hunting stay with the tribal authorities, become mixed up with their other money and never reach those initially intended.<sup>54</sup> Under such circumstances it no longer seems extraordinary that community members distrust their tribal authorities. The problem of nepotism was also frequently mentioned<sup>55</sup>, and the overlap between some of the tribal’s staff and the Forum representatives further reinforces the possibilities for favouritism.

Thus, the average community member in these villages is relatively limited in his or her possibilities. The sensitive relationship between the municipal authorities and the tribal authorities, and the latter’s ambivalent role in democratic South Africa results in the non-existence of an institution the tribal authorities would be accountable to. The only body they could turn to, to express their concerns about the undistributed revenues or about the malfunctioning of the Forum is the provincial government, which is also very cautious in its dealing with tribal authorities and has no power to hold them accountable. Additionally, Polokwane, where the government sits is about 280 kilometres away from these villages, a distance the average community member is highly unlikely to cross in order to file his or her complaints about the tribal.

### **Strike, started by the community members**

*“There is a lot of unhappiness, mostly around Makuya communities that were on strike not long ago around the issues of allegations of people embezzling the money which was due for the development of the community. And you we’ll find that the guys were so close to the clinching of these deals, the guys were arranging negotiations with the department in terms of getting those quotas, their intent see an opportunity for them to also pocket a few of those bucks intended for the community.”<sup>56</sup>*

During the first few months of 2010, a strike was organized by members of the Makuya tribe which lead to the dissolution of the Makuya Tribal Council and the Forum representatives of Makuya communities. People became weary of not seeing the benefits from the reserve (“all the money was going into someone’s coffer”)<sup>57</sup> and of their unreliable representatives and went on a heavy strike, involving stones in the roads.<sup>58</sup> New representatives were selected to demonstrate that from now the communities can achieve what they want.

Based on the account of my interviewees, the strike was a significant and a rather astonishing event in the lives of these communities. It was a deliberate attempt of a group of community members to steer the decisions towards a new, more transparent and accountable direction. It tried to provide a

---

<sup>53</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>54</sup> Interview with acting headman of Duluthulu (Duluthulu, 31<sup>st</sup> May 2010), with Mr. Malange (Polokwane, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2010) and with Olga (Mutele B, 28<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>55</sup> Interview with four park employees (Makuya Nature Reserve, 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2010)

<sup>56</sup> Interview with Eric Rematsea (Polokwane, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>57</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>58</sup> Interviews with Eric Rematsea (Polokwane, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2010) and Calvin (Duluthulu, 1<sup>st</sup> June 2010)

more suitable alternative that would allow the voice of the people to be heard and benefit them as it had been intended.<sup>59</sup>

Was this strike able to bring long term changes? It is difficult to say, because despite the news that the Makuya representatives had been replaced by new people, it was the “old” ones which attended the Forum meeting at the beginning of June, with one of them still serving as the chairman.

## Networks

*“Some of the things which the community has to benefit from, the community doesn’t know about that. It is just for the committee to know that. It was not communicated well. They just come and go back and sit and come again to another meeting without reporting back to the community. That was a problem with all the villages, even including the Makuya one. In all the communities consultations are not there.”<sup>60</sup>*

This quote draws attention to one of the biggest problems of Makuya communities namely, the lack of information and the limited communication channels. It appears that a few key stakeholders (the chiefs and the majority of the Forum representatives) monopolize the communication channels and the networks. The problem with this is twofold. First, they undermine the trust vested in them by the other members of the community. This has negative influence on bonding, i.e. on the extent to which members of a network are connected to each other and have a sense of community. The previous section has demonstrated that people do not trust the local authorities, but LiveDiverse household surveys also show a general mistrust among people (Figure 5). It is difficult to develop a sense of community and coordinated action in a situation where people do not trust one another. Consequently, no effective bridging to other jurisdictional levels will take place, because there is no member of the network which could act on behalf of the community. People in the Makuya villages are convinced that information is withheld from them<sup>61</sup>, others are not even aware of the existence of their representatives. Thus, with such characteristics, these communities will have to overcome serious challenges if they want to form networks and take coordinated measures.

---

<sup>59</sup> The information I have about the strike is based on the account of my interviewees, none of whom have participated in it. I was told that the strike was organized by young people in Hamakuya, but it was not possible for me to go to that village.

<sup>60</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwande Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>61</sup> Interview with community member (Mutele B, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010), focus group discussion (Bileni, 27<sup>th</sup> May 2010)




Figure 5 - Trust in other people (LiveDiverse South African household surveys, 2010)

Nevertheless, there seems to be an emerging network. Recently, a Youth Group was formed in Mutele B by some of the younger members of the community. This can be seen as an attempt to overcome the communication monopoly which is now in place as a result of Forum representatives withholding information. Olga, the secretary of the group said that the aim of the group is determined to find out what exactly is happening regarding the reserve and Chief Makuya.<sup>62</sup> They plan to do their investigation of matters without the Forum representatives, whom they distrust. This group of very motivated young people is even willing to go to the provincial level if necessary to achieve more transparency and a less hierarchical structure. It is possible that they will reach the recently appointed MEC and form a coalition with him to reach their common objectives. This possibility will become even more likely if the Youth Group finds a link between themselves and the provincial government.

### The design principles and Makuya

Now that I have discussed the strategies the different actors use, it is time to evaluate whether the design principles of self-organized resource regimes (Ostrom, 2000) are translated into reality in Makuya Nature Reserve. It is important to keep in mind however, that Makuya is not a self-organized resource regime, thus it is unlikely that all of the characteristics Ostrom (2000) describes would be true about it.

The first principle says that the rules have to be clear to all participants and the members need to know with whom to cooperate. The rules of resource use seem to be relatively clear, most of the people I have talked with knew approximately how much it costs to enter the reserve or to obtain a fishing permit. Regarding the understanding with whom the people should cooperate, the situation is less promising. Although it is one of the tasks of the Makuya Forum to disseminate information, it does not succeed to do so according to my interviewees.<sup>63</sup> As I have already mentioned, many community members are not even aware of the existence of the Forum, let alone about their representatives. Given that it is precisely the representatives with whom community members

<sup>62</sup> Interview with Olga (Mutele B, 28<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

<sup>63</sup> Interview with Thomas Mudzuri (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

should primarily cooperate in order to have their voices heard; it appears that the first principle is hardly the reality in Makuya.

The second principle says that the rules that regulate the harvesting of the resources and allocate the benefits have to take the local conditions into account and have to be proportional to the inputs. The regulations about resource use are decided primarily on the provincial level. Some of the local people I have talked to have told me that it was too expensive or complicated for them to purchase permit for resource use<sup>64</sup> or such a permit does not even exist, for example one for collecting medicinal plants inside the reserve.<sup>65</sup> Traditional healers are important members of the Venda society and the existing rules deprive them from the possibility of fully practicing their roles. In this sense, the local conditions have not entirely been taken into account. The benefits, namely the annual levy paid by the province, are distributed proportionally, although, as I have discussed it above, it does not reach the communities. Other benefits, such as meat seem to be distributed in an unregulated manner, reaching only a portion of the people.<sup>66</sup>

The third principle says that individuals affected by the resource regime should be able to participate in the making and modifying of its rules. Again, the Forum could provide the ideal venue for this, however, the lack of awareness of its existence and the fact that most of the rules of resource use are decided on the provincial level prevent this from being the case. According to Ostrom (2000), rule violations are more frequent in cases when the rules of a resource regime had been established by an elite or a government agency. As I have mentioned already in the section about problem windows, poaching is one of the most recurring topics and problems of the reserve, which may mean that the rules are considered unfair by the locals because they had not been involved in their formulation, or that people do not respect the rules for other reasons, such as the need to provide food for their families.

The fourth and the fifth design principles refer to local monitoring of resource use and sanctions to those who do not abide by the rules. Monitoring in Makuya is a task of the park rangers, who have been hired by the reserve and not appointed by the community. There are graduated sanctions, although they are exercised by the police. However, as Makuya Nature Reserve is a co-managed provincial reserve and not a fully self-organized resource regime, these characteristics are the consequences of the choice of management and not shortcomings of the system.

The sixth principle talks about conflict resolution arenas to resolve disputes between members. The Makuya Forum could serve as an arena for conflict resolution because it brings together the different stakeholders. However, several factors prevent this from being the case. There are no generally known resolution mechanisms attached to the Forum and the previously mentioned mistrust in and lack of knowledge about Forum members hinders the possibilities further.

The last design principle says that recognition of the right to organize by the government also contributes to the effectiveness of a resource regime. The fact that the idea of co-management and even the establishment of the Makuya Forum originated from the provincial government

---

<sup>64</sup> Interview with a community member (Duluthulu, 1<sup>st</sup> June 2010)

<sup>65</sup> Interview with a group of community members (Sanari, 31<sup>st</sup> May 2010)

<sup>66</sup> Interview with community member (Bileni, 25<sup>th</sup> May 2010)

demonstrates that this recognition exists and positively contributes to the potential success of the “resource regime”, even if it has not delegated all the powers to the local level.

## **Conclusion**

The purpose of my research has been to understand and analyse the role of local communities in the decision-making processes of the Makuya Nature Reserve and to evaluate whether they are able to steer the decisions in directions that are beneficial for them. I have analysed the implementation of co-management practices in Makuya through the strategies of idea development, windows of opportunity, coalitions, venue shopping and networks. Additionally, I have used the design principles of long standing resource regimes (Ostrom, 2000) to explore whether Makuya Nature Reserve has the necessary features to be considered as one of them.

My analysis has demonstrated that initially, ideas influencing the management practices were introduced predominantly from the provincial authorities. The proposal for co-management came from LEDET, inspired by the shift to a democratic, more participatory South Africa and the transition to CBNRM in global conservation trends. This idea and its subsequent implementation over the last fifteen years have created expectations and triggered various reactions. Communities have become increasingly vocal about their ideas over time and have suggested the re-introduction of hunting in the reserve, the modification of the benefit sharing scheme and have even proposed to take over the management of the reserve. The individuals now involved in the steering of the discussions include members of the provincial government, tribal leaders and community representatives in the Makuya Forum.

Nevertheless, the majority of the community members are still not familiar with the details of management and unaware of the existence of the Makuya Forum, although the number and complexity of the ideas emerging from the communities suggest that understanding of their rights and possibilities is slowly increasing.

I have identified certain political and problem windows which provide opportunities for steering the discussions in different directions. For instance, changes on the political scene on the provincial and on the local level are potential windows of opportunity for the Youth Group to establish new networks and lobby for more democratic and transparent processes. Such changes might also present opportunities to rearrange the power balance between the three tribes.

Increased media attention on the topics of hunting in protected areas and poaching may help to open new discussions in the Forum. This may prove useful for reconsidering the regulations on hunting and indirectly, may also influence benefit sharing once the issue of hunting and the benefits deriving from it are more strictly overlooked. However, in order to achieve concrete results which can benefit the communities as a whole, stronger coalitions are necessary. The currently existing coalitions are limited in scale and are sometimes formed on the basis of short term personal gains. The absence of coalitions on the local level and the general mistrust that characterises these communities hinders coordinated action, including the formulation of networks.

The fact that some of the available venues, such as the Makuya Forum or the Tribal Authorities are manipulated by a few key actors whom the population does not trust, make the situation even more challenging. As the strike of the Hamakuya community demonstrates, a distinct wish for change exists and people seem to find the more conventional venues inappropriate to communicate such a wish.

Regarding the design principles of a sustainable resource-regime, I believe Makuya is on the right track but more needs to be done in terms of sharing the information and involving community members in the monitoring process. This includes the need for a stronger enforcement scheme: although sanctions for rule violations do exist, it might be useful to expand them over a wider range of violations. Not sharing the benefits should also be considered a violation and sanctioned. The arising disputes could be dealt with in the framework of the Makuya Forum, which could perfectly serve as a conflict resolution arena, were its representatives more trustworthy in the eyes of the community members. Finally, the necessary recognition of the right to organize from higher governmental levels also exists, the province is supportive of increasingly involving the communities.

So, benefit or burden? Are the communities able to steer the practice of co-management in directions that would benefit them? Based on the information I have presented in this research, I believe that certain members of these local communities are very talented in influencing others and “steering the spaghetti”. If these individuals (for example Chief Makuya or some of the Forum representatives) would apply their capacities for the benefit of their communities, co-management could become a positive experience for all those involved. Continuous dissemination of information about the practice of co-management is also indispensable to overcome the currently prevalent lack of awareness on the local level.

Communities around Makuya Nature Reserve have some possibilities to benefit from and cooperate with the protected area their chiefs established. However, they are facing what tends to be a widespread challenge in South Africa: finding the right balance between traditional and democratic institutions. Many of the community members I have interviewed expressed their unhappiness about the tribal authorities or even the chief himself, however, these traditional institutions are still part of a deeply rooted taboo. On the other hand, the ambitious and self-organized Youth Group or the strike in the Hamakuya village might well be the early signs of a new era.

After apartheid, South Africa has to a large extent demonstrated its capacity to re-invent itself as a nation. This huge wave of change was also felt locally in the Makuya area, where steps were taken to try to empower local communities. Fifteen years later, during the 2010 World Cup, the country has reminded the world how it can mobilise its resources to take on new challenges. At the time of ending this research, I hope this incredible energy will now once again be felt locally and will help stakeholders overcome the many obstacles identified in this research. I believe the Makuya area and the people who live there have a great potential and I would be very honoured if this research and the LiveDiverse initiative in general, could contribute a little to make the Makuya Nature Reserve not only an environmental asset, but a social, economical, cultural and political success.

## References

- Animal Rights Africa (ARA) (2010). *Hunting in South Africa: A Bloody Mess*. Retrieved from: [http://www.animalrightsafrika.org/Archive/Hunting\\_in\\_South\\_Africa\\_A\\_Bloody\\_Mess\\_ARA\\_4\\_July\\_2010\\_final.pdf](http://www.animalrightsafrika.org/Archive/Hunting_in_South_Africa_A_Bloody_Mess_ARA_4_July_2010_final.pdf), 15<sup>th</sup> August 2010
- Bouma, J. and Huitema, D. (2009). *Socio-economic vulnerability: Conservation-development trade-offs and agency in multi-level governance processes*. LiveDiverse Conceptual Note Work Package 6. Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit.
- Conway-Smith, E. (2010). South African rhinos under fire. *GlobalPost*. Retrieved from: <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/south-africa/100714/south-african-rhinos-under-fire>, 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2010
- DeGeorges, P.A. & Reilly, B.K. (2009). The Realities of Community Based Natural Resource Management and Biodiversity Conservation in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Sustainability* 2009, 1, 734-788. Doi: 10.3390/su1030734. Retrieved from: <http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/3/734/>, 25<sup>th</sup> April 2010
- Duval Smith, A. (2010). Poachers kill last female rhino in South African park for prized horn. *The Observer*. Retrieved from: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jul/18/poachers-kill-last-female-rhino>, 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2010
- Fabricius, C. & Collins, S. (2007). Community-based natural resource management: governing the commons. IWA Publishing, *Water Policy* 2007, Volume 9 Number S2, 83-97. Doi: 10.2166/wp.2007.132. Retrieved from <http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/009S2/0083/009S20083.pdf>, 21<sup>st</sup> April 2010
- Fabricius, C.; Matsiliza, B.; Sisitka, L. (2003). *Laws, policies, international agreements and departmental guidelines that support community based natural resource management type programmes in South Africa*. Report to the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and GTZ Transform. Retrieved from: [http://www.capegateway.gov.za/Text/2004/5/updatestudy\\_cbnrm.pdf](http://www.capegateway.gov.za/Text/2004/5/updatestudy_cbnrm.pdf), 12<sup>nd</sup> May 2010
- Government of South Africa. (2010). National Protected Area Expansion Strategy for South Africa 2008- Priorities for expanding the protected area network for ecological sustainability and climate change adaptation. ISBN 978-1-919976-55-6. Retrieved from: <http://www.environment.gov.za/HotIssues/2009/npaes/NPAES%20publication%20May%202010%20small%20size.pdf>, 15<sup>th</sup> August 2010
- Hamlyn, M. (2010). Anger over growth in rhino poaching. *News24*. Retrieved from: <http://www.news24.com/SciTech/News/Anger-over-growth-in-rhino-poaching-20100728>, 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2010
- Holmes-Watts, T. & Watts, S. (2008). Legal framework for the practice of participatory natural resources management in South Africa. *Elsevier, Forest Policy and Economics* 10 (2008) 435-443. Doi: 10.1016/j.forpol.2008.02.005.

- Huitema, D. and Meijerink, S. (eds.)(2009). *Water policy entrepreneurs. A research companion to water transitions around the globe*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- IUCN- WCPA, WWF. (1996). *Principles and Guidelines on Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas*. Retrieved from:  
[http://www.wwf.fi/wwf/www/uploads/pdf/indigenous\\_people\\_policy.pdf](http://www.wwf.fi/wwf/www/uploads/pdf/indigenous_people_policy.pdf), 20<sup>th</sup> July 2010
- Kapfudzaruwa, F. And Sowman, M. (2009). Is there a role for traditional governance systems in South Africa's new water management regime? *Water SA (Online)* [online]. 2009, vol.35, n.5, 683-692. ISSN 1816-7950. Retrieved from:  
<http://ajol.info/index.php/wsa/article/viewFile/49195/35538>, 21<sup>st</sup> April, 2010
- Kjaer, A.M. (2004): *Governance*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Limpopo Travel (2010). Annual catalogue. Retrieved from:  
<http://ipaper.ipapercms.dk/LimpopoTravel/UK/Katalog2010/>, 15<sup>th</sup> August 2010
- McShane, T. O. (1990). Wildlands and Human Needs. *Landscape and Urban Planning*, Volume 19, Issue 2, May 1990, 145-158, Interaction Between Local Populations and Protected Landscapes. Retrieved from: [http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?\\_ob=MIimg&\\_imagekey=B6V91-4BD0CKD-4-1&\\_cdi=5885&\\_user=499882&\\_pii=016920469090050C&\\_orig=search&\\_coverDate=05%2F31%2F1990&\\_sk=999809997&view=c&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkWb&md5=e2d8d14a6452494589baa5e954fef644&ie=/sdarticle.pdf](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MIimg&_imagekey=B6V91-4BD0CKD-4-1&_cdi=5885&_user=499882&_pii=016920469090050C&_orig=search&_coverDate=05%2F31%2F1990&_sk=999809997&view=c&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkWb&md5=e2d8d14a6452494589baa5e954fef644&ie=/sdarticle.pdf), 20<sup>th</sup> July 2010
- Meer, T. & Campbell, C. (2007). *Traditional Leadership in Democratic South Africa*. Retrieved from:  
[http://www.ddp.org.za/newsletter-and-articles/traditional\\_leadership\\_in\\_democratic\\_south\\_africa.pdf/view](http://www.ddp.org.za/newsletter-and-articles/traditional_leadership_in_democratic_south_africa.pdf/view), 21<sup>st</sup> April, 2010
- Murphree, M. (2006). Communal Approaches to Natural Resource Management in Africa: Whence and to Where?. *Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy*, Volume 7, Issue 3 & 4 July 2004, 203-216. Retrieved from: <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1j45z5t1>, 11<sup>th</sup> May 2010
- Ntsebeza, L. (2003). Local Governance, Power and Natural Resources: A Perspective from the Rural Areas of South Africa's former Bantustans. World Resources Institute, *Environmental Governance in Africa Working Papers*, WP #14. Retrieved from  
[http://pdf.wri.org/ea\\_lungi.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/ea_lungi.pdf), 21<sup>st</sup> April 2010
- Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer 2000), 137-158. Retrieved from the Vrije University Amsterdam's Blackboard, 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2010
- Republic of South Africa (2006). People and Parks Programme, Conference Report - 29-31 October 2006, Beaufort West, WESTERN CAPE, Retrieved from:  
[http://www.environment.gov.za/HotIssues/2008/people\\_Parks/people\\_parks.html#](http://www.environment.gov.za/HotIssues/2008/people_Parks/people_parks.html#), 12<sup>th</sup> August 2010

- Republic of South Africa. (1996). Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No. 108 of 1996. Retrieved from: <http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf>, 10<sup>th</sup> July 2010
- Republic of South Africa. (2003). No. 57 of 2003: National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act, 2003. Retrieved from <http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68034>, 9<sup>th</sup> May 2010
- Republic of South Africa. (2003). Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill. Retrieved from: <http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/136160/tslg/pdf/traditionalsa.pdf>, 21<sup>st</sup> April, 2010
- SANParks (2008). *Kruger National Park Management Plan*. Retrieved from: [http://www.sanparks.org/assets/docs/conservation/knp\\_management\\_plan\\_final\\_smf2008.pdf](http://www.sanparks.org/assets/docs/conservation/knp_management_plan_final_smf2008.pdf), 20<sup>th</sup> April 2010
- South African Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. (2004). Deputy Minister Mabudafhasi will open groundbreaking People and Parks Workshop. *South African Government Information*, Speeches and statements. Retrieved from: <http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04102208151007.htm>, 15<sup>th</sup> August 2010
- South African Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. (2006). Government assesses the role of protected areas in Local Economic Development (LED) through the People and Parks workshop. *South African Government Information*, Speeches and statements. Retrieved from: <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:4xLk-17uTsEJ:www.search.gov.za/info/previewDocument.jsp%3Fdk%3D%252Fdata%252Fstatic%252Finfo%252Fspeeches%252F2006%252F06103016151001.htm%2540Gov%26q%3D%28%2B%28%28mabudafhasi%29%253CIN%253Etitle%29%2B%29%253CAND%253E%28category%253Ccontains%253Es%29%26t%3DR%2BMabudafhasi%2Bon%2BPeople%2Band%2BParks%2Bworkshop+people+and+parks+workshop&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=be&client=firefox-a>, 15<sup>th</sup> August 2010
- Spierenburg, M.; Steenkamp, C.; Wels, H. (2007): Enclosing the Local for the Global Commons: Community Land Rights in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area. *Representation, Equity & Environment Working Paper Series*, Working Paper 26, World Resources Institute. Retrieved from: [http://pdf.wri.org/wp26\\_mspierenburg\\_et\\_al.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/wp26_mspierenburg_et_al.pdf), 21<sup>st</sup> April, 2010
- Steenkamp, C. & Uhr, J. (2000). The Makuleke Land Claim: Power Relations and Community-based Natural Resource Management. *Evaluating Eden Series, Discussion Paper No. 18*. IIED. Retrieved from: <http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/7816IIED.pdf>, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2010
- Strauss, L. (2010). 152 rhinos poached from January to July 2010. *Kruger Park Times Online*. Retrieved from: <http://www.krugerparktimesonline.com/main1.html>, 22<sup>nd</sup> August 2010
- Turner, R. L. (2006). Communities, Wildlife Conservation, and Tourism-Based Development: Can Community-Based Nature Tourism Live Up to Its Promise?. *Journal of International Wildlife and*

*Law Policy*, Volume 7, Issue 3-4 July 2004, 161-182. Retrieved from:  
<http://escholarship.org/uc/item/Ofq311pw>, 11<sup>th</sup> May 2010

Whande, W. (2007a). *Community-based natural resource management in the southern Africa region: An annotated bibliography and general overview of literature, 1996-2004*. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of Western Cape. Cape Town, South Africa. Retrieved from:  
[http://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10566/72/Whande\\_Community2007.pdf?sequence=1](http://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10566/72/Whande_Community2007.pdf?sequence=1), 19<sup>th</sup> April 2010

Whande, W. (2007b). *Trans-boundary natural resources management in southern Africa: Local historical and livelihood realities within the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Conservation Area*. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, School of Government, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa. Retrieved from:  
[http://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10566/73/Whande\\_Transboundary2007.pdf?sequence=1](http://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10566/73/Whande_Transboundary2007.pdf?sequence=1), 15 April 2010

## Appendix I.

### List of interviewees

1. Shonisani Mphaphuli, Senior Manager, Protected Areas and Mr. Malange, Declarations & Land Acquisition, LEDET, Limpopo Provincial Government (Polokwane, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2010)
2. Margaret Nemutamvuni, Manager, State Owned Nature Reserves and Eric Rematsea, Mutale District Manager, State Owned Nature Reserves, LEDET, Limpopo Provincial Government (Polokwane, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2010)
3. Du Toit Malan, Manager for Planning and Development, Limpopo Wildlife Resorts, Limpopo Tourism and Parks (Polokwane, 24<sup>th</sup> May 2010)
4. Community member (Bileni, 25<sup>th</sup> May 2010)
5. Community member (Bileni, 25<sup>th</sup> May 2010)
6. Acting headman (Bileni, 25<sup>th</sup> May 2010)
7. Mutele Mulina, Deputy Chair Person, Makuya Forum and Etson Mutele, Additional Member, Makuya Forum (Mutele B, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)
8. Community member (Mutele B, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)
9. Community member (Mutele B, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)
10. Thomas Mudzuri, General Manager, Nwanedi Nature Reserve (Eclipse Camp, Nwanedi Nature Reserve, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010)
11. Community member (Mutele B, 28<sup>th</sup> May 2010)
12. Olga (Mutele B, 28<sup>th</sup> May 2010)
13. Community member (Mutele B, 28<sup>th</sup> May 2010)
14. Acting headman (Duluthulu, 31<sup>st</sup> May 2010)
15. Group of community members (Sanari, 31<sup>st</sup> May 2010)
16. Community member (Duluthulu, 1<sup>st</sup> June 2010)
17. Community member (Duluthulu, 1<sup>st</sup> June 2010)
18. Community member (Duluthulu, 1<sup>st</sup> June 2010)
19. Community member (Duluthulu, 1<sup>st</sup> June 2010)
20. Calvin, Makuya Forum representative (Duluthulu, 1<sup>st</sup> June 2010)
21. Community member (Sanari, 1<sup>st</sup> June 2010)
22. Acting headman (Sanari, 1<sup>st</sup> June)
23. Stanley Mukoma, Tourism manager, Makuya Nature Reserve (Makuya Nature Reserve, 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2010)
24. Employees of Makuya Nature Reserve (Makuya Nature Reserve, 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2010)

## Appendix II.

### INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

12.05.2010.

**Brief introduction-** I'm a student from the Netherlands and I'm writing my master thesis about how various actors influence decision making in the Makuya Nature Reserve, and how local communities are affected by this. My research partner in South Africa is CSIR.

#### GENERAL QUESTIONS

- What is your position?
- What is your involvement with the decision process of the Makuya Nature Reserve and how long have you been involved?

#### IDEA DEVELOPMENT

- Could you explain to me where the idea for the joint-management of the reserve come from?
  - a. Who brought the idea forward?
  - b. When did they do so and on the basis of what arguments?
- Who are the main instigators of new ideas more generally regarding jointly managed nature reserves?
- Do local communities play a role in idea development?
- What are the issues currently being decided upon? (means of co-existence with Kruger NP, revenue distribution, sustainable management of the park, access of local communities to the natural resources)
  - a. Do you consider them worthwhile?
  - b. In your opinion, will they be effective in attaining their goals?
- Are there alternative ideas/visions around? (If so, who proposed them?)
- Are the propagated ideas supported and if so to what extent? Is their ability to reach the desired result underpinned by empirical evidence?
- To which extent are these proposals connected/adjusted to stories and perceptions that are relevant for various audiences?

#### COALITION BUILDING

Collaboration is necessary **for the realization of ideas**, this is a delicate task because there might be **opinion differences or power asymmetries** among the actors. Sometimes there is more room **outside the official political circles** for open debates (shadow networks). Coalition building efforts emphasize **shared believes and explicit agreements** on how to use the resources of the actors to achieve the common goals. **Interdependencies** also simulate coalition building.

- Which are the coalitions (groups of parties that have bonded and strive for a common agenda) that have been formed in the process that lead to the decision to jointly manage the Makuya Reserve?
- If coalitions exist:
  - a. What is the time length of the coalitions (permanent or temporary)?
  - b. What is the nature of these coalitions (based on common convictions, worldviews, negotiation/exchange)?
  - c. Could you point out a coalition that is very strong/influential in the decision-making process?

- If no coalitions exist, have there been attempts at coalition building?
  - a. By who, aimed at involving whom?
  - b. In your opinion, what was the key issue that made these attempts failed?
- Are some coalitions better at spanning different jurisdictional scales than others? If so, please indicate which ones.
- Are there any organizations that influence the decision from outside the formal circuits of power?
- What are the coalitions aiming for? Is there a particular issue they are seeking?

### **WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY**

Favourable moments when the circumstances are right to influence the direction of policy processes. Either a certain issue starts receiving more attention by the public/media or some political events take place. Windows of opportunity are unpredictable, however anticipating, recognizing and exploiting them is a key quality of those who successfully influence governance processes.

- What is currently the most important issue talked about in connection with park management?
- How do these issues affect the decision process?
- Can you identify and describe changes in the problems that are being talked about?
- Have certain (focusing) events taken place? Events that caught the attention of the public and that direct the discussions a lot?
- Have certain political changes taken place in the past years that affect the decision process? (e.g. new political leaders)
  - a. How have they affected the decision process?
- Do you perceive certain organizations to be particularly creative in connecting their plans to events that unfold (political, natural)?
  - a. In your opinion, are some local communities more able to connect their plans to arising opportunities than others?
  - b. Sometimes effective use of windows of opportunity requires the rephrasing of ideas (different slogans, different headings). To which extent has this happened in this case? Who did the rephrasing?

### **VENUE SHOPPING**

Decisions tend to be produced at various different places. Sometimes they involve the courts, sometimes community meetings or Parliaments, sometimes scientific bodies, sometimes assessment procedures are required, and sometimes the decisions are taken in the back rooms.

- In your opinion, what, is the place where decisions about Makuya Nature Reserve park are being taken?
- From your perspective, is this a logical choice or not? What is your opinion about decisions being taken at this level? Would there be more suitable alternatives?
- In your opinion, have some of the organizations involved been able to deliberately influence the place where decisions are being taken?
  - a. If so, which organizations and how did they manage to do exercise such influence?

## **NETWORKING**

Activities such as coalition building and the use of windows of opportunity require networking. Such networks differ in the degree to which they bond the members and the extent to which they span levels. They can be closely knit and well aligned in terms of collective views and actions, but they can be relatively ad hoc and short lived.

- Which networks of actors are involved in the decision process I am analyzing?
- How would you describe these networks in terms of bonding/coherence? Are they very strongly bonded (community appearance) or weakly bonded (more ad hoc and issue oriented)?
- Have this network lead a sort of coalition? Basis of coalitions? Better than others to connect with other jurisdictional levels.
- The networks you have described, could you explain whether they reside at one level of decision making specifically, or rather span across levels?
- To which extent are local communities connected to the networks you describe?
- Are the communities in or around the park strongly organized or rather loosely connected? Does the Makuya Forum provide a strong link between the communities involved?
- Do these communities have connections to higher jurisdictional levels? If so, do they use these connections to influence decision making?